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Active Labour Market Policies in Denmark:  
A Comparative Analysis of  Post-Program Effects 
 
Initially presented the 10th October 2008 at Aalborg University during the CARMA (Centre for Labour Market 
Research)’s 25th anniversary conference Employment policy – from research to reform 
French version : « Quels sont les effets du passage par les dispositifs actifs de l’emploi ? Les enseignements 
d’une analyse comparative sur données danoises » MATISSE internal seminar – Centre d’Economie de la 
Sorbonne (CES) » 19 February 2009 
 
Guillaume BLACHE∗ 
University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne / Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne (CES) 
 
Abstract: The scope of the paper is to estimate post-program effects in fostering good transitions from 
unemployment to work. Such an issue implies that besides job finding rates, qualitative variables related to 
work have to be included as well. The evaluation is based on a comprehensive transversal dataset of 
Danes who ended an activation program in the year 2002, merged with individual characteristics and 
yearly information related to their labour market status until 2004. To control for unobserved 
heterogeneity treatment-effects models have been applied. As regards transitions to work and labour 
market integration, main results show fairly large positive effects for private sector employment programs. 
It is worthwhile to be aware that job opportunities for private sector employment participants are highly 
dependent on the business cycle. Besides, the “creaming effects” minimize the positive impact of this type 
of programs as unemployed with longer work experience benefit the most from the private sector. Smaller 
positive impacts are found for labour market training and intensive job seeking, whereas negative 
coefficients are assigned to public sector employment programs. Long-term effects on wages are the most 
positive for those who involved into labour market training. 
 
Keywords: active labour market policies, treatment-effects models, individual trajectories, Denmark. 
 
Résumé : L’objectif de ce papier est d’estimer les effets du passage par les dispositifs d’activation sur les 
transitions entre chômage et emploi. A côté du taux de retour à l’emploi, il est important d’intégrer des 
variables qualitatives telles que le niveau de salaire, le type de contrat de travail et les épisodes d’emploi. 
L’analyse s’appuie sur des données danoises transversales incluant l’ensemble des personnes qui ont 
achevé leur participation à un programme d’activation fin 2002. A côté des caractéristiques individuelles, 
nous disposons d’informations annuelles jusqu’en 2004 par rapport au statut occupé sur le marché du 
travail. Afin de contrôler l’hétérogénéité inobservable, nous avons eu recours aux modèles à effets de 
traitement. Nos résultats mettent en évidence que les programmes pour l’emploi dans le secteur privé 
enregistrent les meilleures performances quant au retour et au maintien dans l’emploi. Il convient de 
préciser que, pour les participants à ce type de programmes, les opportunités d’emploi après la période 
d’activation dépendent fortement de la situation conjoncturelle. Par ailleurs, l’impact positif des 
programmes pour l’emploi dans le secteur privé est atténué par « les effets d’écrémage », dans la mesure 
où ils profitent davantage aux personnes possédant une plus grande expérience professionnelle. L’analyse 
montre que les programmes renforcés d’aide aux chômeurs et les programmes de formation hors de 
l’emploi ont des effets positifs plus faibles sur les transitions vers l’emploi, tandis que les programmes 
pour l’emploi dans le secteur public ont des effets négatifs. Les effets de long terme des programmes de 
formation hors de l’emploi sont les plus positifs sur les niveaux de salaire. 
 
Mots clés : politiques actives de l’emploi, modèles à effets de traitement, trajectoires individuelles. 
 
JEL classification : C21; C52; J64 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Since the well-known Rehn-Meidner model (developed in Sweden 1940-1960) which 
goes beyond the traditional Keynesian and neo-classical approaches by encompassing core 
features such as a restrictive fiscal policy, a "solidaristic" wage policy and an active labour 
market, ALMPs have rather stand the test of time. In the fight against the marginalisation 
process, ALMPs, whose aims are to maintain (or even increase) unemployed skills and 
overcome structural imbalances in the labour market by a better adjustment of labour 
supply to demand (Calmfors & Skedinger, 1995), have been widely used throughout the 
European Union (EU) and to a slight extent in the United States (US). ALMPs belong to 
the group of supply side policies and proactive measures to enhance employability, equity 
and growth while preventing long-term unemployment for those at risk in a more and more 
open economy. With the Luxembourg European Council meeting (20 and 21 November 
1997) and the Treaty of Amsterdam’s title on employment, it was decided that 
« employment guidelines » and multilateral monitoring of economic policies are ways of 
success through accelerating convergence towards the best performance while being 
respectful of the subsidiarity principle1. Taken over by EU (European Union) policies, it is 
used as an instrument for determining when the Union is allowed to act, and, in any federal 
system, to regulate material division of power2. To cope with this form of European 
governance, the "Europe 2020 integrated guidelines" are designed to enhance coordination 
of economic policies. ALMPs effort is listed among the current employment guidelines and 
deserves particular attention from the European policy makers and international observers.  
 Even though different activation strategies have prevailed in Scandinavia since years, 
Denmark becomes the front-runner in this field because of the wide-ranging reforms 
implemented during the 1990s. A renewed interest in the Danish ALMPs may emerge 
among scholars interested by Transitional Labour Markets (Schmid, & Gazier, 2002) 
because of i) the role played by employment policies to manage the process of job creation 
and destruction ii) the emphasis on employment security rather than on job security3 to 
counterpart the "externalisation" of work careers implied by the erosion of internal labour 
markets in "post-fordist" economies, iii) the central part played by "social citizenship" in 
reforming the activation strategy, iv) the way these policies have been negotiated and co-
financed by employees and employers. 
 
 
________________________________________ 
1. Subsidiarity must be understood as the principle according to which the next upper authority should have a 
subsidiary function, performing only those tasks that cannot be performed effectively at the current or any 
lower levels. 
2. Constitutionalists distinguish a formal division of powers, the liberal one, according to the "form" of legal 
texts (acts, regulations…) and a material division of powers, the federal one according to the "matter" of 
decision (foreign policy, health, education…)  
3. "Job security" aims at granting the continuation of the same job and thus does not imply any reallocation of 
work. This component of security is highly dependent of the different national employment protection 
legislation. "Employment security" main purpose is to enhance employability of the workforce to favour both 
transitions from unemployment to employment and between jobs. This component of security comes with a 
reallocation of the workforce and is more often linked to ALMPs and educational policies. 
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  Besides, Denmark is often seen as a textbook case of how to better manage transitions 
between unemployment and employment because of the range of opportunities provided 
by public schemes (including not only "transitional employment" but also more active lines 
such as incentives and upgrading skills).  
  ALMPs’ effects can be regarded as twofold: in a macroeconomic perspective they 
should theoretically improve the unemployment-inflation trade-off by lowering the 
unemployment rate while avoiding supply bottlenecks in the labour market.  
  In a microeconomic perspective, they are supposed to reduce the unemployment spell 
and thus increase the job finding rates via human capital improvement. To sum things up, 
what stand out from the literature is that even though positive effects can be expected from 
ALMPs they appear to be rather small and not that much cost-effective with sometimes 
adverse effects.  
  Nevertheless, only a limited number of evaluations have been carried out with respect 
to long-term effects on wages and type of working contracts. This article tries to fill the gap 
by carrying out an empirical analysis based on administrative register data from Denmark 
Statistics. According to current labour market policies orientations in Denmark, a new 
category will be distinguished as well: services and sanctions programs.  
  Section two addresses the topical issue of the institutional determinants of ALMPs 
development before to move into the adjustments and changes in the Danish « active line ». 
Then, the section presents the reader an overview of the microeconomic literature about 
ALMPs. Section three gives explanations of the different administrative records used to 
make the dataset. This section also provides an evaluation of the determinants of program 
participation through logistic regressions. The fourth section is designed for the empirical 
analysis on individual trajectories.  
 
 
2. THE STAKES OF ALMPs IN DENMARK 
 
2.1 ALMPs and employment security in the “flexicurity triangle” 
 
    Today Denmark is the country with the highest spending on active expenditures (1,6 as 
a % of GDP, OECD 2009). Regarding passive expenditures, Denmark ranks 5 with 1,7 as a 
% of GDP, OECD 2009). It is rather misleading to separate the active part from the 
passive one because they are as one in the Scandinavian activation strategy. In Denmark 
these two labour market policies expenditures are fully integrated in the well-known 
"flexicurity" triangle based on social compromise4. In short, the first angle refers to labour 
market flexibility with high job mobility and a permissive legislation as regards job 
protection. The second angle refers to the generous welfare schemes through income 
security (high compensation rate and long benefit duration). 
 
_________________________________________ 
4. See P.K.Madsen, 2005 for further details about the "flexicurity" model, T.Bredgaard & al., 2007 (1) for a 
disaggregate study of the flexicurity model. 
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  Labour market dynamics and income security form the basic flexicurity nexus. ALMPs, 
which represent the third angle, encompass elements of both social disciplining (incentives 
to take and seek jobs) and social integration (competencies and qualifications to achieve a 
job) according to the "right-and-duty" principle (Graversen & van Ours, 2005). 
  Concerning the functioning of the flexicurity triangle, ALMPs should ensure the 
junction between the two first angles. ALMPs remain one of the main spearheads for 
countries, such as Denmark, whose "flexicurity regimes" are based on the external security 
/external flexibility nexus (Bredgaard & al., 2007 (2)). The external numerical flexibility (i.e. 
high job transitions, low job security) is indeed offset by employment security with a 
reallocation of work (i.e. ALMPs, educational policies) undertaken by the state. Such 
configuration allows firms to adjust more freely to market changes compared to the internal 
flexibility/internal security nexus that bears upon firms’ responsibility as regards job 
security. This conception of the Danish labour market based on the external 
security/external flexibility nexus is somewhat restrictive but sufficient to legitimate 
ALMPs in the functioning of the flexicurity triangle. Evaluations based on companies’ level 
data can bring to the fore new insights about human resources strategies and flexicurity 
(Blache & al., 2008). Some companies, in line with the core-periphery model (Atkinson, 
1984)) can score high on both internal and external flexibility parameters with their 
employees. We should acknowledge that the development of ALMPs in the 90’ happened 
in a period of strong economic upswing, which speeded up the fall in unemployment. 
Often left in abeyance, the significant decline in unemployment through a very short length 
of time has only been possible by overcoming economics circumstances that is the 
macroeconomic context. It required a great deal of precision as regards timing and 
coordination between macroeconomic and structural policies to avoid overheating (Blache, 
2007 (1)). 
  Figure 1 shows that the increase of GDP growth is positively correlated with the fall in 
unemployment. Besides, the trend as regards job creation is quite sensitive to the GDP 
growth trend. The likelihood of transition from unemployment to employment is strongly 
pro-cyclical, that is when the GDP growth steps up the probability of finding job raises 
(Westergard, 2001). Besides, the way the process of job creation and job destruction is 
managed provides some explanations on the growth levels as well as on the unemployment 
levels in Europe (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2006). In that respect, Denmark benefits from a 
very reactive labour market organization with great emphasis put on workforce mobility, 
employment policies and free choices of firms. ALMPs played an important role in 
ensuring a trade-off between inflation and unemployment by maintaining the size of the 
labour force in times of recessions during the 1990s while avoiding bottlenecks once the 
economic upswing was under way (see Layard & al. (1991) for theoretical assumptions). 
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Figure 1.  The GDP growth – employment nexus 
  
  In the Danish flexicurity, the purpose of ALMPs in a more microeconomic perspective 
is twofold: i) activation aims at guaranteeing an incentive for job search in the 
unemployment insurance system. Just before the unemployment benefit period run out, 
unemployed lower their reservation wage and increase their job when they consider 
activation negatively in a perfect foresight model. This effect is better known as the threat 
effect or motivational effect of ALMPs (Geerdsen, 2002; Rosholm & Svarer, 2004). ii) Activation 
may display a qualification effect by enhancing the employability of unemployed and thus, 
improve their likelihood in finding a new job. ALMPs are a key element in the flexicurity 
for workforce development. Ongoing research about the Danish flexicurity model also 
refers to lifelong learning as a crucial linchpin with ALMPs to maintain employment 
security and to cope with structural changes.  
  One of the main reasons for ALMPs longevity in Denmark comes from the tripartite 
negotiation between the government, national employer’s associations and trade unions. 
The backing support of employers has been considered as a crucial linchpin in explaining 
the Danish success toward ALMPs developments (Martin & Swank, 2004; Martin, 2004). 
For the authors, the organization of business matters for social policy development and 
therefore as regards ALMPs spending effort. The more important is the degree of 
corporatism in employers’ organizations, the more important is ALMPs spending at the 
national level. The reason is that centralized employers’ organizations, encompassing 
groups are more likely to go beyond particular interest by focusing on collective concerns 
of their membership (Martin & Swank, 2004). 
  The partisanship model from D.Rueda (2006) shows that contrary to spread ideas 
according to which higher levels of ALMPs are assigned to social-democratic governments, 
the insider-outsider politics do matter the most. The argument starts from the social 
democratic parties’ dilemma because they have to cope both with outsiders demand for 
ALMPs and the fear from insiders as regards to the policies effects on taxes.  
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   Therefore, insiders are being usually more unionized so that social-democratic parties 
should reduce ALMPs efforts. Indeed, what makes them to invest more in ALMPs comes 
from the closer interests of insiders and outsiders, and upstream, the decrease of employment 
protection and the instability of the unemployment rate. Therefore, the increasing 
vulnerability of insiders to unemployment makes them put pressure on governments to 
promote employment policies via collective bargaining. Several examples throughout the 
European Union show that the impulsion comes from insiders vulnerability vis-à-vis 
employment protection and not at all from the nature of government in itself (i.e.1 "New 
Deal" and life-long learning at the end of the 1990s in Britain, i.e.2 in Sweden ALMPs 
spending has been at its highest in the early 1990s when government was conservative, i.e.3 
In Denmark, even though the labour market reform has been implemented by a social 
democratic government, the liberal conservative government has been in continuation of 
the active line in the 1990s (see figure 2.) with even more spending on active expenditures 
and less on passive ones). 
 
Figure 2. The enrolment into activation programs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data source: Statistics Denmark 
 
2.2 From economic compensation rights to economic participation rights 
 
    Since the labour market reform in 1994, several changes have been made with respect 
to the unemployment insurance/ALMPs nexus leading to a new equilibrium between re-
commodification and decommodification5. Activation reforms in the 1990s are to be found in the 
redistributive conflicts and the evolution of the social citizenship (Kvist, 2003).  
_________________________________________ 
5. Re-commodification refers to the ability with which individuals can enter or re-enter the labour market. The 
process is usually attributed to ALMPs. Decommodification refers to the more or less dependency towards the 
market (Kvist, 2003).  
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    The underlying objectives of the reform were to i) improve the employment 
prospects of the unemployed by strengthening ALMPs programs, ii) reduce moral hazard 
through greater incentives, iii) to figure out activation as a counterpart to legitimate 
generous unemployment benefits (maximum replacement rate of 90% of the previous 
income with ceiling).  
   At the beginning of the 1990s, the unemployed could renew their eligibility for 
benefits each time they achieve their participation into one of the activation programs.  
   In 1994, the reform put an end to this rule; the unemployed who have exhausted 
their unemployment benefit period and did not find a job rely on social assistance and have 
to follow an active social program (ASP) to reduce the length of welfare spells. With the 
reform, claimant’s obligations are reflected by a shortening in his benefits period, tougher 
sanctions and to a slight extent cuts in benefit levels. 
Since 1994, the benefit period was divided into two periods. The first 4-year period, 
was called the contact period (or passive period) during which the unemployed might search 
for a job or participate in an activation program. During the second period, a 3-year one, 
which was called the activation period, the unemployed had the right and the obligation to 
accept activation offers (75% of his time).  
The start of the activation period has gradually been brought forward then; since July 
1996, the contact period was reduced from 4 to 3 years, then from 3 years to 2 after January 
1998. Eligibility to unemployment insurance required at least 12 months (initially 6 months 
before June 1996) membership in an unemployment insurance fund (taking over by unions) 
and 12 months employment during the last 3 years. Since 1994, claimants can be excluded 
for their second refusal job, or second activation offer. Note that such an orientation in 
Denmark did not provide high risks of displacement among unemployed because of the 
high arrival rate of job offers (Albæk et al., 2002) and the effectiveness of its profiling 
system. Tighter obligations have also been set up as regards mobility requirements, both 
occupational and geographical.  
In 2000, the activation period starts after one year of unemployment spell. During these 
successive changes, the activation period duration remained constant. Finally, from 2002 
onwards, the distinction between the two periods was abolished, and unemployed are 
indeed required to accept activation offers at any time during their unemployment spell (in 
practice after 6-9 months of unemployment).  
  To cope with the high level of unemployment in the early 1990s, besides the activation 
path Denmark pursued a citizen’s income path during the 1990s through various leave schemes 
and retirement labour market programs. Leave schemes will not be included in the analysis 
because they are not used any more since 2000 with the return of full employment and the 
risk of wage pressure. The reduction of early retirement schemes has also been a key 
objective by the present government and will not be included in the analysis as they 
maintain people out of the labour market. 
  Activation is still a priority in Denmark as regards the high level of ALMPs 
expenditures. Nevertheless, new orientations have been conducted by the liberal-
conservative government (Venstre og Konservative). Since the year 2002 with the reform "more 
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people to work", work incentives (i.e. tax deduction) with more emphasis on social welfare 
recipients (i.e. ceiling on social assistance deposits) became more relevant. Besides, efforts 
have been done in immigration/integration policies through various programs such as "new 
law on immigration" (2002) and "a new chance for all" (2005) mainly consisting of a tighter 
follow-up and stronger obligations for this target group. In short, because of the relative 
low level of structural unemployment and the persistence of social exclusion (about one 
quarter of the population depend on welfare scheme and are therefore outside the labour 
market), policy priorities and targeting groups have changed. Raising labour supply is a 
crucial linchpin to safeguard welfare and anticipate the growing share of retired population 
in the future.  
  For the time period used in our analysis, activation offers for insured unemployed were 
usually made by the local employment agency. The 14 local labour market councils (in each 
counties, Amter) can decide to target programs to specific groups when needed. Despite the 
decentralisation process, the labour market councils are based on corporatist principles with 
centrally formulated goals by both employers and employees. From now on, with the 
administrative struktural reform (2007) and the removal of counties, the implementation of 
active labour market programs is under the competence of municipalities. The government 
has also made a few institutional changes as regards the administrative organisation of the 
public employment system.  
  Without going more into details, we still have to mention recent additional reforms 
such as the inclusion of private providers and the creation of a one-string system (eng-strenget 
system) for more flexibility and efficiency in the monitoring of both unemployment benefit 
recipients and welfare benefit recipients. In spite of the decrease in the level of 
compensation, the maximum of four years unemployment benefits (UB) has remained 
unchanged until very recently (Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 2009). Since 2010, the UB 
maximum duration was cut from 4 to 2 years. In return, dismissal payments have been 
introduced by collective agreements in 2010 for those with job tenure of more than three 
years. Henceforth, participation in activation starts after 3-6 months of unemployment 
according to age. Last but not least, the use of ordinary education has steadily decreased 
from 2001 to 2011 with greater emphasis put on incentives programs. Thus, these types of 
programs will be included as well in our analysis. Four heading categories of active labour 
market programs will be distinguished (cf. box n°1). 
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Box n°1. A classification of active labour market programs in Denmark 
 
*Private sector employment programs: generally last between 6 and 9 months. These programs 
mainly refer to subsidized as private job training during which the unemployed is offered an 
employment with a private employer. During the activation period, a wage subsidy is paid to the 
employer. The aim of private job training is to provide the unemployed a real work experience before 
to be integrated into regular employment. Adult apprenticeship support also belongs to "private sector 
employment programs". Adult apprenticeship support fits situation when there is a shortage of persons 
with a specific education within a specific area. The third program who belongs to the "private 
sector employment programs" category is labour trainee that aims at increasing skills through 
working into a private company. No wage subsidy is paid to private employers.  
 
*Public sector employment programs: more often last between 6 months and one year and 
encompass either subsidized employment or direct job creation both in the public sector. Public job 
training has been included in the category. This program is exactly the same as private job training 
described above except from the sector differentiation. Individual job training that provides hard-to-
place unemployed a temporary job also belongs to this category. The job can take place either in 
an association or in the public sector but cannot take the form of an ordinary employment with a 
private employer. As regards direct job creation and temporary job in the public sector, services jobs 
and pool jobs have been integrated. Services jobs aim at improving the employability of long-time 
unemployed through direct jobs creation in the public sector. Pool jobs consist of temporary jobs 
within the public sector while participants continue to receive unemployment benefit. Voluntary not 
paid activities of community interest have been integrated as well in the category. 
 
*Education/training programs (or labour market training programs): consist of all types of 
classroom training and last a few months. It can take the form of various measures: adult education 
subsidies, education with training allowance, specially adapted educational activities and adult further education. 
This category aims at enhancing unemployed employability and takes place either in the ordinary 
education/training system or in special tailor-made programs. During participation in such 
programs, the unemployed can receive a training allowance which corresponds to the 
unemployment benefit that the person concerned would otherwise has been entitled to. 
 
*Services and sanctions programs: as regards today labour market policy orientation in Denmark, 
it is preferable to integrate services and sanctions rather than a category called "other programs" 
which is more often too heterogeneous and does not prove anything. Two complementary 
programs are integrated into this category: intensive job seeking and advisory/introductory activation that 
are preventive measures based on vocational guidance and individual action plan. 
 
Note that in our dataset, we initially had targeted programs such as measures for the disabled (flex-
jobs and light-job) and measures focusing on immigrants (course in understanding of the society, Danish 
lessons and adapted activation). These programs will not be compared with the four heading programs 
because of their peculiarities.  
 
Source: adapted from Kluve (2006) and ECOTEC (2004) 
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2.3 ALMPs and individual trajectories: some results from the literature 
 
   The evidence put forward by the literature is that individual trajectories are highly 
affected: i) before participation, by the threat effect (or pre-program effect) which significantly 
increases the job search activity just before participating in programs often perceived as 
being too restrictive (Black & al., 2003; Lalive & al. 2002), ii) during participation, by the 
locking-in effect which reduces the job search activity owing to the lack of time when 
individuals have to complete an ongoing skill-enhancing activity, iii) after participation, by 
the post-program effect (or treatment effect), normally supposed to enhance employability and 
thus, increases the chance of getting unemployed back to work (Van Ours, 2004; 
Richardson & Van den Berg, 2001; Lalive & al., 2002).  
  The post-program effects are more often measured through employment probabilities, 
employment spells and individual earnings6. Even though there is an extensive and growing 
empirical literature about ALMPs, post-program effects at the individual level constitute one of 
the main controversial issues. The content of programs, the selection process, the business 
cycle and the estimating models as well differ across the studies (Raaum & al., 2002). 
Nevertheless, some evidence can be underscored from international cross-country surveys 
(Heckman & al., 1999; Martin & Grubb, 2001; Kluve & Schmidt, 2002; Kluve, 2006).  
  Main results show that private employment subsidies are associated with a higher 
probability of yielding positive post-program effects. Training programs are the most expensive 
and widely used active measures in Europe and appear to be positive on single mothers but 
have rather poor effects on other vulnerable groups such as youth and older workers with 
low initial education. Job creations in the public sector provide no real benefits in the long-
term. Besides, they convey low marginal product and are often seen as hiding the real level 
of unemployment. Regarding services and sanctions, which are the least costly measures 
their effects are rather non-conclusive. The positive impact of job-search assistance 
depends on the quality of employment services and monitoring control. Only a few studies 
have been conducted about sanctions programs even though a well-balanced system 
including job search assistance, claimants’ obligations (with sanctions in case of default 
leading in some cases to partial suspensions of unemployment benefits) and training has 
proved to be more efficient. Concerning youth measures, they usually show a negative 
picture despite a few national successful programs when they come with wage subsidies. 
   
 
 
 
_________________________________________ 
6. If these three effects can obviously induce the matching process (Edin & Holmlund, 1991) microeconomic 
analyses are also important as regards: i) ALMPs indirect effects on "non-treated" people (i.e., displacement effect 
when individuals in subsidised programs are hired at the expense of others due to relative costs changes, 
deadweight effect referring to the situation where participants beneficiaries would have also been hired in the 
absence of the program (Calmfors & al.,1995; Forslund & Krueger, 1993), deposit) and expectation effect in 
reducing welfare-loss from being out of work (Korpi, 1994, Raaum & al. 2002), iii) windfall effects and creaming 
effects can be observed as regards to the selectivity of recruitment in ALMPs programs. 
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  Because of the extensive use of active labour programs, which are particularly costly in 
Denmark, it is quite obvious that investigations had been conducted to assess post-program 
effects. Based on fixed effect estimation, K.Langager (1997) shows that the effects are the 
most positive and significant for private job training participants, while being small as 
regards to public job training beneficiaries, and with even adverse effects for those engaged 
into education schemes. On the government side, the Ministry of Social Affairs shows the 
same results (Arbejdsministeriet, 2000). Based on different foresight expectation models as 
regards to the shortenings in the passive unemployment insurance period in the 1990s, a 
first breakthrough by Geerdsen (2002, 2006) tackled the presence of an important threat 
effect prior to activation (net increase in the overall hazard rate after the activation plan 
which precedes full time participation into one of the compulsory activation programs). 
  Even though pre-program effects are beyond the scope of the paper, we must keep in mind 
that when the threat effect is not included in the analysis post-program effects are downward 
biased (Rosholm & Svarer, 2004). Nevertheless, the threat effect depicted by Rosholm & 
Svarer (2004) does not affect post-program effects in comparison between programs: in both 
situations (threat effect included or not) private sector employment programs have the 
most positive post-program effects on the job finding rate. Post-program effects are close to zero 
for public employment programs and education/training measures while being negative for 
the other programs’ category.  
  With respect to the flexicurity triangle, ALMPs’ motivational effects (pre-program effects) 
have therefore proved to be more effective than qualification effects (post-program effects) in 
reducing the duration of unemployment. Treatment effects have mainly been investigated 
in terms of employability and transitions to work. Within the scope of the European 
Employment Strategy, further analyses are needed about ALMPs long-term effects on 
qualitative variables such as wages, employment duration and extent of working time. There 
is little compelling evidence that ALMPs in Europe have had a positive impact on 
participants’ wages (Heckman & al., 1999). Results stated in the literature remain 
controversial compared to the effects on employment probabilities. Consistent and positive 
effects have been found in Norway (Raaum & Torp, 2002).  
  As for Denmark and Sweden results are very sensitive to the time period used and the 
methodology applied. Using fixed effects models, Jensen & al. (1993) find small wage 
effects as regards labour market training programs whereas Westergaard and Nielsen 
(1993), based on a bigger cohort of participants found positive impacts. As regards labour 
market histories, common findings show that the duration of subsequent employment 
spells after participation increase for private job training, decrease for public job training 
while classroom training has no effect (Bonnal, 1997; Ham & Lalonde, 1996; Eberwin & al., 
1997, Munch & Skipper, 2008). 
  Recent evaluations using well advanced models tried to estimate jointly the transitions 
out of unemployment, the duration of employment and the wage impacts (Gerfin & al., 
2005; Lechner & al., 2004; Munch & Skipper, 2008). Using an indicator of job quality 
(continuously employed for at least 3 months with earnings of at least 90% of those in the 
last job), Gerfin & al. (2005) find that subsidized temporary employment program is the 
most efficient ALM programs in Switzerland. Based on the same multiple treatments 
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model, Lechner & al., (2004) investigate the impact of public sector sponsored training 
programs in Germany. Negative short-term effects and positive long-term effects have 
been outlined by Lechner & al., (2004). Based on an extended multivariate duration model, 
Munch & Skipper (2008) find longer spells of employment at the cost of a lower hourly 
wage rate for private and as well as ordinary classroom training. The effects of public job 
training are negative for all variables of interest (Munch & Skipper, 2008). 
  Our article contributes to the international literature in two ways: Firstly, the evaluation 
can be seen as a possible extension of previous research because of the emphasis put on 
new qualitative variables. Even though the main purpose of ALMPs’ is to get unemployed 
back to work, the extent of working time is an important matter if we consider the potential 
long-term effects of non-permanent work on the quality of working life, employee’s overall 
labour market position and prospects (Gimeno & al. 2004; Scheele, 2002; Virtanen, 2006). 
This paper evaluates the impacts of ALMPs on the job finding rates but also on qualitative 
indicators such as the extent of working time and the wage level. Besides, the use of 
transversal data will give an overview of the employment dynamics.  
  Secondly, by the methodology applied and the use of updated data, the paper sheds 
new lights on the effects of Danish programs. At the time of our analysis, no evaluation has 
been runt on the baseline year 2002 (that is when the passive period has been theoretically 
removed). Most previous studies have been conducted on longitudinal data covering the 
period 1995-2000. The programs’ classification used and the inclusion of a « services and 
sanctions » category should also bring new insights as regards today employment policy in 
Denmark.  
 
 
3. THE SELECTIVITY OF ALMPs PROGRAMS 
 
3.1 Data 
 
  The data made available by Statistics Denmark include different administrative 
registers. In Denmark, every resident is assigned a personal identification number (CPR), 
and all lifelong this number is logged in encounters with most private and public systems. 
Thanks to the existence of such a unique identification system, Statistics Denmark can use 
it to create a wide spectre of merged data sets, which describe the entire population. Tightly 
framed by the law, research institutions have only access to an anonymous version of the 
file.  Everything about activation enrolment is collected by the AMFORA (Register on Labour 
Market Measures). This register provides information on the average number of people 
participating in labour market policy programs, and various variables such as: type of 
measures, date of commencement and cessation for the measure, hours per week for the 
measure and type of subsidy/placement. The year 2002 has been chosen as baseline, such 
as the sample includes all people who ended a program in the end of November 2002. The 
year 2002 was preferred in order to have sufficient retrospective interviews to follow people 
over time.  
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  Background variables (age, sex, gender...) as well as the ones about the last job (sector 
of industry, occupation, and work experience) have been taken from the IDA register 
(Integretet Database for Arbejdsmarkedsforsking). IDA contains information from various 
statistical registers at Statistics Denmark. The variable « highest completed education » 
comes from a register called « Education and employment of the population » and the 
information on origin comes from a register called « immigrants and their descendants ».  
  To follow people over time, the socio-economic status of individuals is another 
variable drawn from the register called RAS (Register-based Labour Force Statistics). 
Following the guidelines set by the ILO (International Labour organisation) as regards the 
identified statuses, RAS statistics contains information on the Danish population's 
attachment to the labour market at the end of November each year (Statistics Denmark).  
Based on the classification described in previous section, a categorical variable have been 
made for participation into one of the activation programs. Modalities focusing on target 
groups (immigrant and disabled) have of course been dropped out when performing multi-
treatment analyses. We will come back later on the models applied.  
 
Table 1. Description of the sample. Baseline: year 2002  
 observations % val. % cum. % 
Private sector employment  16018 7,1 8,4 8,4 
Public sector employment  47644 21,1 25,1 33,5 
Education and training 60417 26,8 31,8 65,3 
Services and sanctions 28928 12,8 15,2 80,5 
Integration programs  32317 14,3 17,0 97,5 
Measures for the disabled  4834 2,1 2,5 100,00 
Total programs 190158 84,2 100,00  
Missing values 35594 15,8   
Individuals in the dataset 225752 100,00     
 
  80,5% of the total sample is represented by the four main groups of programs defined 
in previous section. Within the private sector employment programs’ category, the highest 
frequency participation is observed for private job training followed by Adult 
Apprenticeship and Labour trainee. Public individual job training represents the highest 
share of persons in the public sector employment programs’ category followed by  public 
job training , service jobs, voluntary not paid activities and pool jobs whith a non significant 
number of people. The Education/training programs’ category was widely used and 
concerns 26,8% of the entire sample. The most important measure in this category is 
education with training allowance and specially adapted educational activities. The 
distribution of people in services and sanctions is slightly the same between intensive job 
seeking and advisory/introductory activation. In line with the Danish Venstre og Konservative 
governements’ policy, we can note that a fairly amount of individuals has been enrolled in 
an integration program (14,3% of the entire sample). Measures for the disabled represent 
only 2,1% of the entire sample. Nevertheless, it remains one of the Danish labour market’s 
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peculiarities when in most of European countries only passive expenditures are 
implemented as regards this group of people.  
  Three variables of interest have been identified: i) transitions to work at the end of 
November 2003 and 2004, ii) transitions to full-time job at the end of November 2003 and 
2004 (these variables are made from two categorical variables related to the "socio 
economic statuses" and "extent of working"), iii) Wage level (continuous variable) at the 
end of November 2003 and 2004. Note that we dispose of the same information for the 
last job occupied by those who were wage earners one year before. Transversal data will 
allow us to depict the dynamics of employment (cf. Appendix A10).  
Various explanatory variables have been included in the analyses. We can classify them in 
three categories: 
  The first category refers to background variables that may have an impact on work 
supply. We have a set of categorical variables related to i) age, ii) gender, iii) family type, iv) 
level of education attainment, v) origin. In the evaluation, we use traditional background 
variables such as age, gender, level of education attainment and add "family type" and 
"origin" variables. The "family type" can have an impact on the job finding rate and the 
extent of working time but also on the selection process at entry as single parents may 
prefer short training period to cope with family responsibilities. The "origin" variable has 
been included as well because immigrants can find difficulties compared to natives or 
descendants in terms of employment and/or wages. 
  The second category refers to information about the last job occupied (for those who 
were employed one year before) and include variables such as: i) types of industry, ii) types 
of occupation, iii) work experience. Employment history and pre-program variables notably 
as regards "work experience" have been included because these indicators influence both 
the variables of interest and the selection process. Unemployed with less labour market 
attachment provide bad signals to the employment agencies and be then victims of creaming 
effects. The "types of industry" tell us whether unemployed worked in expanding sectors or 
not. This variable may influence the likelihood of finding a job.  
  The third category encompasses instrumental variables (Z), which help to identify the 
treament's effect and make the estimates more robust. These instrumental variables must 
fulfil two conditions i) be correlated with the program's entrance (Y1): corr (Z,ζ) ≠ 0 (null 
hypothesis rejected, the correlation coefficient is strictly different from zero), ii) be 
exogenous (not correlated with the variable of interest or more precisely with the error 
terms (ξ) of the second step equation): corr (Z,ξ) = 0 (null hypothesis is not rejected, the 
correlation coefficient may be equal to zero). A first instrumental dummy variable about 
being insured or not has been included. This variable is highly correlated with the selection 
process but still has an impact on some variables of interest (i.e. the job finding rate 
because of skills bias). Therefore, another instrument variable has also been added. This last 
one refers to counties (Amter) unemployed belong to and is well justified for the period 
used because of the decentralisation process of ALMPs implementation to the 14 labour 
market councils. This variable shows more significant results for both conditions.  
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3.2 Selectivity and targeting 
 
  In order to address the sample selection or endogeneity problem, an evaluation of the 
determinants of program participation has to be made. If our sample fulfils the eligibility 
rules, the selection decisions of caseworkers are indeed influenced by the economic 
situation of unemployed as well as the political orientation formulated by the labour market 
councils. Employment history and the state of the local economy matter to understand how 
unemployed end up in different programs (Heckman & Smith, 2004). In the same way, 
unemployed according to their motivation and ability may prefer to join short time 
programs, which do not affect too much their leisure time (Lechner & al, 2004). We can 
also expect that participation declines markedly with age.  
  As regards the empirical determinants of program participation, we should wonder 
whether there are creaming effects or not. « Creaming » among participants happens when the 
most likely to succeed without any treatments are selected instead of unemployed who 
should benefit the most from the program (highest social return on the investment in 
activation). This situation occurs mainly when the performance of programs is measured 
primarily by job placement rates. An efficient profiling system can help to counter ingrained 
behaviour (Bell & Orr, 2002). It matters to consider this issue because such a situation leads 
both to inefficient allocation of public resources and biased effects as regards ALMPs 
(Andersen & al., 1993). Besides, this analysis will allow us to identify who benefits from 
activation and evaluate how the target groups of the ALMPs programs differ from each 
other. Thus, it will partly solve the issue of what happens to the general considerations 
regarding the different corners of the "flexicurity triangle" when the analysis is broken 
down into various sub-groups.  
  The selectivity of recruitment in the selected activation programs has been analysed via 
logistic regressions (log-odds): 
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  From the set of explanatory variables described in previous sub-section, the logistic 
regression allows us to predict discrete outcomes related to participation in a given 
programs’ category with a probability of success θ(x) = θ(di=1) and a probability of failure 
1-θ(x) = θ(di=0). After isolating θ(x) from the logistic equation, we obtain the "probability" 
of entering (1.2) and not entering (1.3) in one of the selected type of programs: 
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α represents the constant and βi the coefficients of the predictors that is the individual 
characteristics (x) of people. By getting rid of the log, the odd ratio (exp β) is easier to 
interpret than the logits (log odds, β). It refers to the estimated change in the log odds of the 
dependent variable per unit change in the predictor variable.  
  Because explanatory variables have been defined as categorical in our model, 
coefficients reported in table 2 can be interpreted as marginal effects of an independent 
variable category compared with a reference category (exp β= 1).  
  Table 2 points out that unemployed participating in the four categories of programs 
slightly differ as regards background and pre-program variables. Public sector employment 
programs which are theoretically designed for the less able focus much more on the youth, 
unemployed with less work experience and with a relatively short education.  
  If we look at background variables, individuals with lower education level attainment 
(ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education), i.e. basic school)) have better 
chance to be involved for both private and public employment programs. As regards 
gender, female are more likely to participate to education/training programs. This result is 
consistent with recent analyses (see Hansen, 2007). If integration programs are removed, 
immigrants and descendants have greater odds in entering into training and education 
programs.  
  The participation declines with age for employment programs and education/training 
programs. We may suppose that the amortization period of the human capital investment 
shrinks for the eldest group of unemployed. These results are in concomitance with the 
high number of people in retirement schemes at this time. The sector of employment and 
the type of job don’t affect that much the selection process.  
  What is important to note is that we have a creaming effect as regards private sector 
employment programs. For those with more than 10 years’ work experience, the odds in 
entering into this type of programs are about 2 times better than the reference group.  
  Even though services and sanctions programs should in principle focus on the most 
vulnerable groups, those who were employed at the upper level appear to enjoy a better 
access. The reason may come from the underlying "work first" strategy of these programs, 
which are more profitable for the most resourceful unemployed. We can also suppose that 
because this group of unemployed benefits from social network they are more able to find 
a job quickly, thus making public intervention unnecessary. This dead-weight effect can be 
better evaluated through qualitative investigations.  
  The different modalities within the tow instrument variables (unemployment insurance 
and counties) appear to have significant results as regards the selection process. People with 
no insurance have greater odds in entering into public employment sector programs. The 
decentralisation of ALMPs implementation brings to the fore clear evidence about counties 
autonomy with respect to the local labour market context.  
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Table 2. The odds of being involved in one of the selected programs  
 
Ind. variables/type of activation 
programs 
Private emp 
sector 
Public emp 
sector 
Education
/training 
Services 
/sanctions 
 exp β exp β exp β exp β 
Age     
([18-25]) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) 
[26-30] 1,091 0,726*** 1,389*** 0,917* 
[31-35] 1,105 0,745*** 1,343*** 1,044 
[36-40] 1,033 0,730*** 1,279*** 1,065 
[41-45] 0,917 0,769*** 1,255*** 1,124** 
[46-50] 0,867* 0,852*** 1,230*** 1,125** 
[51+] 0,614*** 1,232*** 0,998 1,283*** 
Gender     
(Male) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) 
Female 0,698*** 0,893*** 1,165*** 1,135*** 
Family type     
(Couples with children) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) 
Couples without children 1,032 1,005 0,881*** 1,041 
Singles with children 0,930 1,164*** 0,943 0,992 
Singles without children 0,901* 1,195*** 0,837*** 1,073** 
Highest education completed     
(Basic school/preparatory) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) 
General upper secondary 0,820*** 0,856*** 1,008 1,209*** 
Vocational training and edu. 1,127*** 0,811*** 1,067*** 1,134*** 
Short-cycle higher edu. 0,978 0,600*** 1,210*** 1,379*** 
Medium-cycle higher edu. 0,756*** 0,667*** 1,325*** 1,082 
Bachelor edu. 0,896 0,509*** 1,491*** 0,909 
Long cycle higher edu. 0,869 0,647*** 1,549*** 1,070 
Origin   
(Danish) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) 
Immigrant western country 1,174 0,819** 1,162** 0,849** 
Immigrant non-western country 0,919 0,610*** 1,801*** 0,577*** 
Descendant western country 0,747 1,047 1,141 0,899 
Descendant non-western 
country 0,772 0,745 1,191 1,025 
Sector of employment (last job)    
(Agriculture, fishing, quarrying) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) 
Manufacturing 1,110 0,860** 1,021 1,055 
Electricity, gas and water supply 0,952 0,716*** 1,251*** 0,954 
Construction 1,140 0,964 0,881** 1,144** 
Retail trade, hotel and 
restaurants 1,372 0,897** 0,872*** 1,089* 
Transport, post and telecom 1,150 0,883* 0,975 1,067 
Finance and business activities 0,883 1,373*** 0,807*** 0,959 
Public and personal service 0,460 1,501*** 0,950 0,917* 
Type of job (last job)     
(Self-employed) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) 
Top manager 0,833 0,736 0,931 1,328 
Employees upper level 1,113 0,729*** 0,987 1,208*** 
Employees medium level 1,052 0,777*** 0,973 1,033 
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Employees basic level 1,114 1,298*** 0,919* 0,887** 
Other employees 1,200** 1,623*** 0,786*** 0,803*** 
Work experience (last job)     
(No work experience) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) 
Up to 5 years’ experience 1,873*** 1,144 0,774*** 1,094 
Between 6 years and 10 years 1766*** 0,999 0,967 1,096 
More than 11 years’ experience 1,999*** 0,800** 1,100 1,003 
Unemployment insurance     
(Not insured) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) 
Insured 1,264*** 0,306*** 6,923*** 2,897*** 
Counties Amter     
(Københavns) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) (1,00) 
Frederiksberg 1,987*** 2,681*** 1,599*** 2,026*** 
Københavns Amt 1,978*** 4,637*** 1,433*** 1,853*** 
Frederiksborg Amt 3,335*** 7,072*** 0,965 1,906*** 
Roskilde Amt 2,492*** 8,375*** 1,904*** 0,919 
Vestjællands Amt 2,724*** 5,184*** 3,636*** 0,362*** 
Storstrøms Amt 2,683*** 9,278*** 1,178*** 1,234*** 
Bornholms region 1,943*** 5,846*** 2,233*** 0,844 
Fyns Amt 2,454*** 3,256*** 1,786*** 0,772*** 
Sønderjyllands Amt 3,755*** 9,085*** 1,885*** 0,580*** 
Ribe Amt 3,406*** 9,013*** 2,433*** 0,192*** 
Vejle Amt 3,679*** 7,088*** 1,189*** 1,266*** 
Ringkøbing Amt 4,719*** 8,467*** 1,519*** 0,623*** 
Århus Amt 2,332*** 6,152*** 1,422*** 1,715*** 
Viborg Amt 3,165*** 7,122*** 1,325*** 1,106* 
Nordjyllands Amt 3,368*** 7,203*** 2,867*** 0,307*** 
     
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign.at the 1% level (α = 0,01) 
 
In brackets are the reference categories for each qualitative variable. The unemployment insurance and counties 
variables represent the instrument variables used for a robust identification of the effects in the sample selection 
models. 
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4. AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF POST-PROGRAMS EFFECTS 
 
4.1 Methodological choices 
 
  This section aims at providing explanations about the methodology applied to the 
identification of treatment effects and how selection bias in ALM programs is controlled 
for. One of the main difficulties in evaluating ALMPs is to take into account 
counterfactuals that refer to "possible outcomes in different hypothetical states of the 
world" (Heckman, 2008). In other words counterfactuals have to do with the potential 
outcomes if individuals had not been treated. Therefore, the main issue is how to obtain the 
treatment effect of those treated compared to a state, where they were not treated.  
  Since participation in a program is compulsory for unemployed in Denmark it has been 
difficult to determine a "control group" (unemployed who did not enter into an activation 
program). Previous analyses on the Danish labour market underscored that because 
unemployed have to participate in an ALM program at some point in time, those who stay 
unemployed long enough are few (Munch & Skipper, 2008). Recourse to internal "control 
groups" composed of those who quit activation programs could have been a solution. They 
may represent interesting "control groups" because they fulfil the requirements for 
participating in ALM programs. Nevertheless, such a strategy can be subject to important 
bias as long as individuals may leave either because they are less motivated or they find jobs 
by themselves during their participation in the programs (most resourceful group of 
unemployed).  
  One of the most advanced methods to build up counterfactuals for compulsory 
programs is to apply the timing-of-events model from Abbring & Van den Berg (2003). The 
basic idea is that the starting dates of program participation vary among individuals during 
the unemployment spells. Therefore, unemployed who are not yet participating in ALMPs 
are used as a comparison group over this time interval that is until they enter in one of the 
program (Lalive & al., 2008; Munch & Skipper, 2008). Even though this kind of model is 
relevant in many aspects, we can expect that the degree of variation over time until entry is 
shrinking due to the removal of the passive period since the year 2002. Besides, the 
assumption is based on hazard functions and thus implies the use of weekly longitudinal 
data. Unfortunately, when making the analyses, we did not have such data at our disposal.  
  To overcome this problem, each program category is considered in its turn as 
"treatment group" when value 1 is assigned to them. All other program categories set up 
the "comparison group" taking the value 0. Therefore, program categories compete among 
one another. At some point, counterfactuals correspond to the potential outcomes when 
individuals participate in programs other than the one investigated. In our paper, effects are 
forward-looking which means that a baseline forecast is required. The baseline simulation 
was generated for two consecutive years knowing that participants ended their activation 
period at the end of the year 2002. Because some measures last for a short time and others 
for several months, when analysing post-program effects, it is more accurate to follow 
participants whose activation program is over rather than those who just started one. 
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  Individuals participating in an activation program (treatment group) should 
theoretically be similar to those who did not participate except for the treatment status, 
which can influence the dependent variables. Only the participation in programs varies 
among individuals. Such an assumption cannot easily be checked because of selection bias 
or omitted variable bias (Heckman, 1979). In our analysis, selection bias arises when 
participants in an activation program may differ from other participants on both observed 
and unobserved characteristics. Unobserved characteristics refer to variables that are 
difficult to measure (i.e. ability, motivation, state of mind, social network) or cannot be 
observed. Besides self-selection, participants are also subjected to non-random selection 
process by the employment services and employers. Statistically speaking, selection bias 
occurs when observed and unobserved factors, which influence the odds of being involved 
in one program, also influence the impact of the program. Therefore, simple regression 
estimates of programs’ effects may be statistically biased when factors that impact 
participation decisions are correlated with outcome measures. Whereas observed 
characteristics are easy to control, the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity implies the use 
of specific econometric.  
  In our analysis, Treatment Effects Models have been used to provide unbiased 
estimates of programs’ impacts. These extensions of the Heckman’s two-step procedure or 
sample selection model (1979) are based on a simultaneous estimation of two regression 
functions: the first one analysis the selection process at entry while the second one provides 
unbiased estimates of the impact of program participation on outcomes. More details about 
the procedure are given throughout the section. Note that Treatment Effects Models may 
vary according to the nature of the dependent variables. Among procedures for addressing 
selection bias7, the two-step adjustment has the advantage of providing an estimate of the 
specification error while modelling the selection process8. Because of the dichotomous 
nature of the dependent variables ”transition to work’ and ”transition to full-time job”, a 
seemingly unrelated bivariate probit with endogeneity (Maddala,1983; Fabbri & al., 2004) 
has been estimated first. The model takes the following form with two probit regressions: 
 
ζβ += ii XY 111*                                                  (2.1) 
ξδδ ++= iii XYY 22112*               (2.2) 
 
Y*1i and Y*2i are latent variables measuring i) selection to one specific programs category 
and ii) the transitions to work and/or full-time job: Y1i = 1 (Y1i is observed) if Y*1i> 0 and 
Y2i = 1 (Y2 is observed) if Y*2i> 0. X1i and X2i refer to the observed determinants (or vector 
of covariates), β1 and δ2 to the associated parameters. In the second equation (2.2), Y1i is a 
binary treatment dummy whose unbiased effect δ1 is the object of interest.  
 
 
________________________________________ 
7. Besides the Heckman two-step procedure, instrumental variable (IV) and longitudinal methods (i.e. "fixed 
effects" and differences-in-differences estimators) can be performed as well depending of the dataset. 
8. In order to shorten the presentation, results from the first step equation have not been reported in the 
appendix. One can refer to the previous section for an overview of the selection process at entry. All results are 
still available upon request. 
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  Among the explonatory variables X1i in the first-step selection equation (2.1), we must 
identify at least one instrument variable (Z) which fits the following conditions: corr(Z, ζ) ≠ 
0 and corr(Z, ξ) = 0. The error terms (or random disturbance) of the two equations ζ and ξ 
are dependent and distributed as a bivariate normal so that: E(ζ) = E(ξ) = 0, var (ζ) = var (ξ) 
= 1) and ρ = cov(ζ, ξ). In other terms, ρ aims at testing the error terms correlation. The 
Wald test provides evidence on the correlation between the unobserved variables of the 
two equations. If ρ is significantly different from zero, then the null correlation between the 
error terms is rejected. It means that Y1 is endogenous for the second equation.  
  Therefore, the two equations are dependent and the effects of programs can be 
subjected to selection bias. Conversely, when ρ= 0, then Y1 is exogenous for the second 
equation and the use of sample selection models are not justified. Assuming that error 
terms are jointly normally distributed, the simultaneously estimate of the two probit 
regressions is based on the maximum likelihood. As for the variable “wage level”, because of 
its continuous nature, an endogenous treatment effects model has been used (Ashenfelter, 
1978; Heckman & Robb, 1985):  
 
ζβ += ii XY 111*                                                  (2.3) 
ξλδδδ +++= 322112 iii XYY             (2.4) 
 
  With ζ following a normal law of N(0; 1) and ξ a normal law of N(0; σζ). The terms in 
the first step equation (2.3) are similar to those in the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit. 
The aim is to estimate the causal effects of a binary variable Y1i (participation or not to one 
of the programs category) on wage level Y2i after participating in an activation program.  
  A probit model estimates the first equation (2.3) whereas the second one (2.4) is 
estimated by an ordinary least squares (OLS) because of the continuous nature of the 
dependent variable. Assuming that error terms taken jointly are normally distributed, the 
simultaneous estimate of the two regressions is based on the maximum likelihood. The 
inverse Mills' ratio or selection hazard: standard normal probability density function over 
standard cumulative function) extracted from the probit model is integrated as an additional 
regressor (λ) in the second-step to take account of the selection bias.  
  The parameter of the Mills' ratio (δ3) provides an estimate of the selection bias. Note 
that the computation of the inverse Mills' ratio does not appear in the biprobit model 
because the estimation can only be performed by the Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood (FMIL) on most statistical softwares. The inverse Mills' ratio is computed in the 
second-step only if the treatment effects model is performed by using the two-step 
maximum likelihood rather than the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FMIL) (in 
case of nonconvergeance). 
  Therefore, when using the two-step estimation in treatment effects models, instead of 
ρ estimation, the relevance of the treatment effects model is based on the significance of 
the non selection hazard coefficient. The interpretation of the significance is the same than 
ρ described for the bivariate probit model. It gives an idea of the two equations dependency 
and the relevance of the sample selection model compared to one simple linear regression. 
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  Contrary to models described above, when selection is among a large number of 
exclusive choices, the multinomial logit specification (Mc Fadden, 1973) exposed in details 
by Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2004) should be preferred. If we look at the 6 
activation categories designed in section (3.1), at least 4 of them are in principle targeted 
towards every unemployed. In actual fact, there are substantial differences between 
programs’ categories that do not fully justify the use of multi-treatment analysis for the 
first-step equation. Although individuals are not eligible for all programs’ categories, 
multitreatment could provide supplementary information as regards effects on different 
groups. Because of their peculiarities, targeted programs towards immigrants and disabled 
have been removed. The dependent variable in the selection equation contains four 
modalities whereas the dependent in the outcome equation is only observed for one 
modality (or one programs' category). When using multi-treatment models, the form taken 
by the dependent variables slightly differ from univariate or binary models. In this kind of 
models, the dependent in the selection equation is a multiple choices one. Besides, the 
outcome variable is observed for only one modality of the categorical variable about 
activation programs (see Bourguignon & al., 2004). The rest of the sample is therefore 
censored in the second-step equation. Note that this kind of models does not fit with 
impact evaluations because no coefficient (δ1) is assigned to the programs’ effect in the 
second equation. Nevertheless, the use of censored data in the second equation allows us to 
compare δ2 coefficients between programs (see Appendix A5 to A8). The covariances 
between residuals mx from the multinomial logistic regression and the second step 
regression provide tests for endogeneity.  
Three caveats have to be taken into account:  firstly, it has not been possible to take 
into account counterfactuals so that the analysis has been made in a comparative 
perspective between programs’ categories. Since participation in a program is compulsory 
for unemployed in Denmark it is difficult to determine a real "control group". Even though 
new insights have been depicted by the use of qualitative variables, monthly information 
about the duration of employment spells after activation can bring to the fore new lights as 
regards labour market integration. Secondly, once the employment security guaranteed, the 
question is whether previously unemployed keep regular jobs over time or not, when 
transitions to work occurred after ending an activation period. This issue has been partly 
resolved by using post-program annual data on labour market attachment (see Annexe A9). 
Thirdly, interactions between variables could have also been taken into account to focus on 
target groups who deserve particular interests in today labour market policies in Denmark 
(i.e. immigrants). 
 
4.2 Employment effects of Danish ALMPs programs: an estimation 
 
  Results from the first-step equation as well as targeted programs have not been 
included in order not to complicate the presentation. All results are still available upon 
request. Each coefficient reported in tables A1 to A8 in Appendix can be interpreted as a 
probability conditional on the other observables which belong to the same initial categorical 
variable. ρ and the hazard λ are significantly different from zero (except for private 
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employment sector as regards the wage level variable). Thus, the hypothesis of endogeneity 
between the selection equation and the outcome equation is verified. 
  After taking due account of the observed and unobserved heterogeneity, private job 
training has a significant positive effect (δ1=1,25) as regards transitions to work in the 
retrospective two years after participation (cf. Tables 3 and A1). This positive post-program 
effect confirms previous empirical evidence (see Rosholm & Svarer, 2004).  
  The private sector employment category gets the highest score as regards job finding 
rates. The conditional probability that private sector beneficiaries stay in employment two 
years after, given that they successfully managed to find a job one year after is 80,2% (cf. 
Table A9). The employment rate increases in the highest proportion (∆Yi =35,3) for 
participants to this type of programs (cf. Table A10). The difference in comparison with the 
other type of programs is the most important as well (βddd= 29,1). Let’s notice that, for all 
programs participants who were wage earners before the baseline, the employment rate 
fairly improves. The relative evolution of the employment rate is negative only for previous 
wage earners who ended a public sector employment program. The outcome regression 
depicts a significant negative coefficient (δ1= -0,64) for this type of programs which means 
that participants are less likely to find a job (cf. Tables 3 and A2).  
  The well-known argument is that private job training beneficiaries are generally more 
skilled than those in public job training and can be hired afterwards if they fit employers’ 
needs (Langager, 1997). In our analysis, the large positive effect of the private sector 
employment programs’ category is not the result of skills bias (cf. Table 2) but may be 
attributed to the greater work experience of participants. Besides, jobs provided by this type 
of programs are closer to the "ordinary" labour market. Such a situation leads to "contact 
effect". That is private job training creates contact between employers and marginalized 
groups who can be hired afterwards in the firm where the activation has been completed. 
As regards recruitment, we must acknowledge that the number of available jobs (thus job 
opportunities for private sector employment participants) is highly depending on the 
business cycle (Raaum & al., 2002). Let’s notice that for the retrospective years used in the 
analysis, the economic conjuncture was favourable after an economic downswing between 
2001 and the mid-2003 (for further details, see figure 1).  
  Education/training programs’ category have rather small positive impacts (δ1= 0,55) 
(cf. Tables 3 and A3). Results obtained for this type of programs are in line with previous 
studies. Nevertheless, this group of programs is very heterogeneous if we look at the job 
finding rates (cf. Table A9). Some programs perform better than others when they come 
with a subsidy. 62,7% of participants in Adult education subsidies find a job while 94,4% of 
them manage to keep their job after the first year in employment.  
  As regards services/sanctions programs, when the much-used category "other type of 
activation programs" is narrowed to intensive job seeking and advisory activation, the post-
program effects on transitions to work are slightly positive (δ1= 0,44) (cf. Tables 3 and A4). 
This result is consistent with recent micro econometrical evaluations. Taking into 
counterfactuals through an experimental study Graversen & van Ours (2005) show that 
Post-program effects on the job finding rate for a two weeks intensive job seeking is higher in 
the treatment group than in the control group (those who do not participate to the 
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program). This significant positive effect and the lower cost of this type of programs should 
deserve particular interest as regards today labour market policy orientation in Denmark. 
All things being equal, these positive results can be attributed to dead-weight effects depicted in 
the selection equation. The argument that “services and sanctions” programs are more 
efficient for individuals with higher skilled is not verified in our analysis. The multinomial 
logistic regression estimates show that participants to intensive job seeking may expect 
positive transitions to work whatever their educational level attainment (cf. Tables A5 to 
A8). The same goes for the other type of programs even though the results are not always 
significant.  
  The use of censored data in the second equation for multinomial logit models allows us 
to yield some disparities between programs among sub-groups. Public sector employment 
and education/training appear to be more effective when targeting to less skilled people (cf. 
Tables A6 and A7). Despite the type of programs, some groups appear to have better 
labour market prospects than others. If we look at other observed factors, the origin-
geographical interactions suggest that immigrants from non-western countries are less likely 
to find a job compared to unemployed with Danish origin, immigrants and descendants 
from western countries (cf. Tables A5 to A8). The employment probability of immigrants 
compared to natives is one of the lowest in Europe (Causa & Jean, 2007).  
  Another discriminating aspect of the Danish labour market is that unemployed who are 
more than 50 years old are less likely to find a job than those who belong to other age 
brackets. The youth are the most positively associated with the job finding rates. Until now, 
the strategy concerning the eldest unemployed has been to keep them outside the labour 
market through early retirement schemes. Indeed, a substantial part of the population 
(27%) remains outside the labour market and thus, depends on the various welfare 
programs. Let’s notice that the « unemployed » represents only a small proportion (14%) of 
the "did not work" category that mostly comprises those "out of the work force" (Blache, 
2007 (1)). The eldest has proved to be the first victims of the Danish flexible labour market 
(Jensen, 2007).  
  Nowadays, employment and welfare systems in Denmark but also in most European 
countries are faced to new stakes notably due to demographical changes. Raising labour 
supply is a crucial linchpin to safeguard welfare and anticipate the growing share of retired 
population in the future. Expanding the range of employment opportunities for the eldest 
as well as the tightening of fiscal should become one of the priorities of the Danish 
government. The June 2006 agreement has given recommendations to that end by 
developing age management (Jensen, 2007). The set of determinants as regards the last job 
occupied is relevant too: those with a greater work experience and who were upper level 
employees are more likely to find a job (cf. Table A5 to A8).  
  Gender does not affect transitions to work while singles with children show more 
difficulties to find a job. The reason may come from the lower flexibility of this group in 
the labour market as regards spatial and temporal mobility (Soidre, 2004). Even though the 
Danish public day care system is recognized for the quality of its services (Hansen, 2007), 
tuition costs for full-time care are too high for single parents with lower attachment to the 
labour market. Even though Denmark performs best in terms of empowerment from a life-
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at-work perspective (Blache, 2007 (2)), single parents which are mainly women have more 
difficulties than other to cope with both work and family life. The likelihood of the 
unemployed lone mother to find a job has long been constrained by discrimination. Danish 
local authorities frequently asked for a disposable income as regards day care fees, thus 
priorities full-time working parents (Slotz, 1997). 
 
4.3 Impacts on qualitative variables 
 
   As regards qualitative outcomes all programs positively influence the transitions to 
full time job except for public employment programs (δ1= -1,37). The reason might be the 
missing helping hand qualification so that beneficiaries have to narrow their job search to 
part-time low productive activities.  
  The observed characteristics show that flexibility is mainly applied to young workers, 
immigrants and those with less work experience. Individuals from the retail trade, hotel and 
restaurants sector and those who were selfemployed are also more exposed to part time 
job. It is also stated that the extent of working time is not affected by the family type and 
the education level attainment.  
  We must aknowledge that the permissive legislation as regards employment protection 
and the retraining requirements in a more egalitarian perspective make the insider-outsider 
labour market in Denmark less rigid than in most European countries. One of the Danish 
peculiarities is that internal numerical flexibility based on the extent of working time creates 
a type-of-contract segmentation among high-skilled workers on flexible employment 
relationships.  
  A group of academically-qualified workers accepts insecure and atypical employment in 
order not to loose their attachment to the labour market whereas others are well-paid « free 
agents » (Jørgensen, 2000). The situation of the first category of workers concerns the 
economic sectors where the competition and the level of unemployment are the highest. In 
a theoretical perspective it can suggest a new interpretation of the implicit contract theory 
to control adverse risk (Azariadis, 1975). In the longer run, the extent of working time 
should matter in the analyses of individual trajectories because it can affect prospects and 
working life regardless the legislation settings. Compared to some European countries, 
casual work in Denmark is independent from employment history and is submitted to the 
Salaried Employees Act when the employment contract lasts more than three months. As 
for the legal protection related to dismissal, compensation differs according to the duration 
of the employment. Training opportunities are also more important for full-time workers. 
The extent of working time is therefore submitted to both elements of decommodification 
and segmentation.  
  The wage level variable shows a different picture of programs’ effects. 
Education/training programs perform best compared to other programs (δ1=19,25). In line 
with the human capital theory (Becker, 1964), unemployed who participate in labour market 
training programs can expect an increase of their productivity in the long-term and thus 
apply for a higher wage (Dearden & Van Reenen, 2005). Referring to job search models 
(Mortensen, 1977) unemployed increase their reservation wage and thus may also extend 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.71
  
 
 27
the unemployment duration. The multinomial logit models show that the less skilled 
unemployed have greater opportunities in terms of wage levels when participating into 
education/training programs (cf. Table A7). Besides, individual characteristics highly 
influence the wage level whichever the program is. Unemployed with medium-or long-cycle 
higher education and with longer labour market attachment can expect greater salary. The 
segmentation is more obvious as regards wage in comparison with the other variables of 
interest. Let’s notice that in Denmark the spread of the salary range remains small with a 
Gini coefficient of 0,22. 
  Coefficients are negative but no significant for public and private sector employment 
programs. These results are consistent with recent evaluations (Munch & Skipper, 2008). 
Following Becker’s distinction between "specific" and "general" capital, employment 
programs provide skills that cannot be used effectively outside the firms where the training 
period has been completed. Therefore, participants cannot apply for a higher wage outside 
the firm where skills were acquired. A stigmatization effect can also be put forward. 
Subsidized programs could indeed be perceived by employers as to be a signal of lower-
than-average productivity (Munch & Skipper, 2008).  
  When looking at background characteristics, the education level attainment, the labour 
market attachment and the type of occupation as regards last jobs occupied matter in the 
wage level structure. Besides, unemployed youth get more difficulties in getting a high paid 
job after ending an activation period. The same remark can be formulated for gender. 
Strong disparities are depicted between female and male when looking at the wage level.  
 
Table 3. Summary of the main Post-program effects+ 
 
Programs/var.of interest Job finding rate (1) Extent of working time (1) Ind. earning (2) 
  Transitions to work Full-time work Part-time work Wage levels 
     
Private sector employment 1,2494*** 1,3709*** -1,6431*** -9,3215 
 (0,1015) (0,0247) (0,0273) (6,6621) 
Public sector employment -0,6396*** -1,3709*** 1,3722*** -36,0249 
 (0,0447) (0,0390) (0,0442) (3,0808) 
Education/training 0,5480*** 1,5813*** -1,7910*** 19,2522*** 
 (0,0324) (0,0238) (0,0275) (2,2501) 
Services and sanctions 0,4439*** 1,3960*** -1,5332*** 12,7363*** 
 (0,0500) (0,0217) (0,0236) (3,0047) 
 
Asymptotic standard errors appear in parentheses, *significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% 
level (α = 0,05) ***sign.at the 1% level (α = 0,01) 
 
(1) Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit. Method of adjustment: Full Information Maximum Likelihood.   
(2) Treatment effects. Method of adjustment: Two-step Maximum Likelihood. 
+ Observed characteristics, multinomial logit estimates and test of endogeneity are reported in Appendix. Note 
that only results for the year 2003 have been reported. Post-program effects after two years are available upon 
request. Results in a longer period do not differ that much despite a slight increase over time. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
  After reviewing the main breakthroughs in the evaluation of ALMPs in Denmark, we 
came back to the intrinsic reasons of the Danish employment success. These are the 
favourable macroeconomic context and the corporatist agreements on designing labour 
market policies. Then, based on Danish micro-data, the paper dealt with ALMPs post-
program effects on various quantitative and qualitative outcome variables. We accounted 
for potential unobserved heterogeneity issues by using treatment effects with sample 
selection.  
  The main findings about transitions to work are consistent with previous analyses. It is 
worth noticing that private sector employment programs perform best in terms of getting 
unemployed back to work. Though, "creaming effects" minimize the positive effect of this 
type of programs as unemployed with longer work experience benefit the most from the 
private sector. New lights have been yielded as well: firstly, the analysis provides suggestive 
evidence that services and sanctions programs have rather positive effects for each variable 
of interests. The good results obtained for these programs justify the concern that more 
incentives and tailor made programs could be developed in order to fulfil the Danish right 
wing motto "getting more people into work". Nevertheless, all things being equal, this kind 
of programs may be subjected to "dead-weight effects". Secondly, the long-term effects of 
education and training programs are significantly positive. In line with human capital 
theory, unemployed who participate into labour market training programs are more prone 
to increase their productivity in the long-term and thus apply for a higher wage. Good 
signals (in the sense of M. Spence, 1975) may as well be emitted to employers when the 
activation program comes with an education. In that perspective, adult apprenticeship 
support can be a good example of how to combine education and wage subsidies. 
Obviously, further analyses based on employers' interviews are needed in this field. Besides, 
because job opportunities after activation are depending on the business cycle (especially 
for private sector employment programs), comparisons of the effects during economic 
upswing and economic downswing could also bring to the fore new insights.  
 Since the 2008 global crisis, recent labour market development and reforms have been 
recently conducted in Denmark. When looking at the lowest rate of unemployment in 
Europe, Denmark felt from position 1 to 5. Although the Danish unemployment remains 
low when looking at the rest of Europe, its unemployment rate went from 2,6% to 6,6% 
between 2008 and 2009 (Eurostat, 2010). Tighter deadlines for mandatory interviews with 
the job-centres and the obligation to take part in activation programs earlier have been 
implemented. Those who are under 30 years old have the right and duty to participate in an 
activation measure after 3 months of unemployment. For unemployed over 30 years old, 
the activation period starts after 6 months. Based on political agreements driven by social 
partners, incremental changes were enforced in the contents of activation measures. Two 
"packages" have been targeted towards youth and long-term unemployed during 2009 and 
the first part of 2010 (Jørgensen, 2011; Madsen, 2010).  
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  The cut from 4 to 2 years in the UB maximum duration, the stress laid on the "work 
first" strategy during the liberal-conservative government (2001-2011)9 and the lack of 
corporatist concertation imply that Denmark tends to move away from the initial flexicurity 
model that prevailed during the 90s (Klindt, 2011). Nevertheless, the political responses to 
the economic crisis are consistent with the flexicurity rationale, which aims at stabilizing 
employment and fostering growth (Jørgensen, 2011). Despite incremental changes, Nordic 
countries still differ from other countries because of its encompassing welfare states and 
invasive tax systems, which act as stabilizers (Jochem, 2011). Likewise, flexicurity in itself 
has proved not to be a frozen concept. On that respect, short time working arrangements 
could be considered as a new form of activation when providing at the same time training 
to workers (Wilthagen, 2010). Indeed, the United Federation of Danish Workers 
(Fagligt Fælles Forbund) proposed that work-sharers should be offered further training during 
the period of work-sharing. Although internal flexibility can mitigate unemployment flows 
during economic slowdowns, ALMPs aim at fostering and facilitating the transitions on the 
labour market.  
  Thus, one might well wonder how ALMPs should be used in time of economic 
upturns and economic slowdowns in a European policy perspective. First and foremost, 
when the economic growth is sufficiently employment-intensive, employment policies can 
be used to ease placement of workers during retraining schemes or to face up to labour 
shortage in some sectors. In that case, education and training as well as intensive job 
seeking are the most effective measures to cope with labour shortage. 
  During a slowdown in global growth employment policies should act differently and be 
run at their utmost. ALMPs can play an important role to sustain labour demand and 
improve employment prospects for unemployed. From a macroeconomic perspective, 
labour market policies are used for stabilisation purposes. Besides guaranteeing passive 
expenditures and upgrading unemployed skills through labour market training programs, it 
is necessary to push down recruitment decisions through subsidised employment programs, 
and thus reducing the cost of labour. Wage subsidies can either take the form of fiscal 
exemptions (i.e. reductions in social contributions when hiring low-wage workers) or direct 
financial incentives to firms. Employment policies can also act on job vacancies through 
direct creation of jobs in the public sector.  
  When public debt reduction stays one of governments’ priorities, this solution has 
proved to be inefficient and inconsistent. Some countries are lacking the financial capacity 
to carry out demand-oriented policies for economic stabilization. Even though the Danish 
public budget turned from a surplus of 3.4% in 2008 to a deficit of 2.7% of GDP in 2009 
(Eurostat, 2010), Denmark has more scope than most of European countries for making 
decisions. ALMPs programs with wage subsidies can thus be financially more effective 
when targeted to vulnerable groups (young workers, low skilled workers, ...). The reason is 
that taking into account "dead-weight effects" may help governments to better allocate 
subsidies and save on those who could have been hired anyway. This implies an effective 
profiling system at program’s entrance that is hard to settle in the end.  
_________________________________________ 
9. A left coalition led by the social democrats (socialdemokraterne) and the socialist people’s party (Socialistik 
Folkeparti) has won the Danish parliamentary election of 2011.  
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  Besides European countries have different institutions that may imply structural 
adjustments to better adapt to economic downturns. As we have seen, ALMPs are closely 
embedded to other institutional settings in Denmark. While controlling the cost of high 
passive expenditures, ALMPs have often played first fiddle in the management of job 
creation and job destruction whatever the economic context.  
  All in all, concrete evidence show that impacts vary noticeably among activation 
programs in Denmark, whereas further investigations are needed as regards resources and 
capabilities of vulnerable groups. According to economic circumstances, the European 
governments should stress first and foremost on specific programs.  
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APPENDIXTable A1. Post-Program effects of private employment programs 
 
 
 
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign.at the 1% level (α = 0,01) 
(1) Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit. Method of adjustment: Full Information Maximum Likelihood.   
(2) Treatment effects. Method of adjustment: Two-step Maximum Likelihood. 
Ind. variables/Dep.var. Job finding rate (1) Extent of working time (1) Individual earning (2) 
  Transitions to work Transitions to full-time Transitions to part-time Wage levels 
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Effects of private sec.emp. 1,2494*** (0,1015) 1,7235*** (0,0247) -1,6431*** (0,0273) -9,3215 (6,6621)
[18-25] 0,3406*** (0,0262) -0,2509*** (0,0423) 0,3821*** (0,0467) -8,5384*** (1,5091)
[26-30] 0,1648*** (0,0252) -0,0197 (0,0415) 0,1288*** (0,0460) 4,4229*** (1,4192)
[31-35] 0,1216*** (0,0246) -0,0126 (0,0407) 0,0994** (0,0454) 4,603*** (1,3616)
[36-40] 0,0564** (0,0241) -0,0229 (0,0404) 0,0678 (0,0456) 2,5982* (1,3442)
[41-45] 0,0748*** (0,0250) -0,0274 (0,0404) 0,0987** (0,0470) 3,1383** (1,3822)
[51+] -0,4129*** (0,0231) 0,0117 (0,0409) -0,0372 (0,0464) 1,4189 (1,3699)
Female 0,0503*** (0,0126) 0,1632*** (0,0199) -0,0961*** (0,0215) -16,8801*** (0,7417)
Couples with children 0,1394*** (0,0154) 0,0814*** (0,0246) -0,1509*** (0,0272) 0,1873 (0,8856)
Couples without children 0,1107*** (0,0150) 0,0283 (0,0237) -0,0384 (0,0253) 0,5121 (0,8778)
Singles with children -0,8732*** (0,0235) 0,0566 (0,0410) -0,1347*** (0,0451) -2,1652 (1,3906)
Basic school/preparatory 0,0186 (0,0332) 0,0727 (0,0538) -0,0497 (0,0583) -4,9026** (2,0904)
General upper secondary 0,2873*** (0,0371) -0,1704*** (0,0580) 0,1565** (0,0625) -4,086* (2,3284)
Vocational train. edu. 0,1544*** (0,0339) 0,1697*** (0,0549) -0,1607*** (0,0596) 1,2953 (2,1111)
Short-cycle higher edu. 0,2570*** (0,0440) 0,1956*** (0,0710) -0,2680*** (0,0798) 9,2560*** (2,6465)
Med.-cycle  higheredu. 0,2924*** (0,0410) 0,3563*** (0,0687) -0,4056*** (0,0772) 16,1781*** (2,5010)
Bachelor edu. 0,2909*** (0,0748) 0,4210*** (0,1257) -0,3704*** (0,1344) 18,1516*** (4,2868)
Long-cycle higher edu. 0,3425*** (0,0461) 0,4895*** (0,0771) -0,5568*** (0,0881) 30,3324*** (2,7894)
Immig. western country -0,0047 (0,0349) -0,0995* (0,0559) 0,1227** (0,0601) -3,0913 (2,1098)
Immig. non-west country  -0,0538 (0,0194) -0,0256 (0,0303) -0,1048*** (0,0336) 2,1265* (1,1860)
Descendant west country  0,1421 (0,1050) 0,0177 (0,1574) -0,0010 (0,1698) 5,2739 (5,9780)
Desc.non-west country 0,0649 (0,5931) 0,0462 (0,0830) -0,1296 (0,0870) 4,2219 (3,5503)
Agr., fishing, quarr.  -0,0422 (0,0294) -0,1061** (0,0476) 0,1586*** (0,0520) -0,7215 (1,7460)
Manufacturing -0,0704** (0,0307) -0,1061** (0,0592) 0,1319** (0,0552) 6,2231*** (1,8025)
Electricity, gas and water  -0,081** (0,0382) 0,0231 (0,0662) 0,0249 (0,0721) 2,0375 (2,1437)
Construction -0,0047 (0,0319) -0,1146** (0,0513) 0,0724 (0,0560) 11,3130*** (1,8463)
Rtrade, hotel a restaurants  0,0096 (0,0265) -0,2980*** (0,0422) 0,2849*** (0,0458) -2,0162 (1,6142)
Transport, post, telecom 0,0443 (0,0324) -0,1605*** (0,0518) 0,2146*** (0,0554) 5,9659*** (1,8947)
Finance and business -0,0921*** (0,0254) -0,1185*** (0,0425) 0,1332*** (0,0461) 0,6771 (1,5299)
Public and pers. service 0,0453* (0,0259) 0,0832* (0,0439) -0,0492 (0,0476) -6,6911*** (1,5523)
Self-employed 0,0843*** (0,0253) -0,4758*** (0,0370) -0,1779*** (0,0447) 6,5090*** (1,6786)
Top manager 0,0992 (0,0967) 0,3391** (0,1720) -0,2818 (0,1868) 44,5841*** (5,0981)
Employees upper level 0,1497*** (0,0314) 0,1875*** (0,0531) -0,2172*** (0,0604) 21,2610*** (1,8557)
Employees medium level 0,0680** (0,0267) 0,1908*** (0,0450) -0,2428*** (0,0510) 10,9061*** (1,4767)
Employees basic level 0,0261** (0,0128) 0,1426*** (0,0205) -0,1323*** (0,0217) 1,5153** (0,7398)
No work experience -0,0857* (0,0457) -0,1517** (0,0686) 0,0027 (0,0769) -8,5413** (3,5583)
From 6 years to 10 years 0,1246*** (0,0161) 0,1886*** (0,0265) -0,1606*** (0,0288) 6,6961*** (0,9349)
More than 11 years  0,2242*** (0,0187) 0,2588*** (0,0314)  -0,2193*** (0,0350)  10,3901*** (1,0844)
Hazard Lambda - - - - - - 4,2072 (3,5599)
Athrho -0,5230*** (0,0716) -2,2488*** (0,1149) 2,4792*** (0,0970) - - 
LR test of rho=0   Prob> chi2= 0.0000           Prob> chi2= 0.0000          Prob> chi2= 0.0000
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.71
  
 
 36
Table A2. Post-Program effects of public employment programs 
 
Ind. variables/Dep.var. Job finding rate (1) Extent of working time (1) Individual earning (2) 
  Transitions to work Transitions to full-time Transitions to part-time Wage levels 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. 
Effects of public sec.emp. -0,6396*** (0,0447) -1,3709*** (0,0390) 1,3722*** (0,0442) -36,0249 (3,0808)
[18-25] 0,4139*** (0,0263) -0,1370*** (0,0469) 0,3378*** (0,0574) -5,2853*** (1,5760)
[26-30] 0,1680*** (0,0252) 0,0016 (0,0460) 0,1667*** (0,0570) 3,6020** (1,4593)
[31-35] 0,1243*** (0,0246) 0,0074 (0,0456) 0,1370** (0,0573) 3,6310** (1,4012)
[36-40] 0,0559** (0,0242) -0,0338 (0,0455) 0,1243** (0,0580) 1,8915 (1,3831)
[41-45] 0,0696*** (0,0251) -0,0105 (0,0477) 0,1373** (0,0604) 2,3546* (1,4218)
[51+] -0,4105*** (0,0230) -0,0202 (0,0462) -0,0098 (0,0600) 2,4856* (1,4095)
Female 0,01162 (0,0125) 0,1164*** (0,0215) -0,0410* (0,0246) -17,2094*** (0,7415)
Couples with children 0,1478*** (0,0153) 0,1897*** (0,0271) -0,3531*** (0,0325) -0,8305 (0,8856)
Couples without children 0,1102*** (0,0150) 0,0849*** (0,0255) -0,1201*** (0,0285) -0,8469 (0,8882)
Singles with children -0,0745*** (0,0236) 0,1423*** (0,0445) -0,2679*** (0,0523) -1,6601 (1,4256)
Basic school/preparatory 0,0376 (0,0333) 0,1030* (0,0573) -0,0657 (0,0662) -2,4582 (2,1551)
General upper secondary 0,2575*** (0,0372) -0,2519*** (0,0614) 0,2658*** (0,0701) -2,4574 (2,3826)
Vocational train.edu. 0,1529*** (0,0340) 0,2159*** (0,0588) -0,2228*** (0,0684) 1,9461 (2,1707)
Short-cycle higher edu. 0,2119*** (0,0443) 0,1468* (0,0775) -0,2914*** (0,0966) 8,7532*** (2,7152)
Med.-cycle higher edu. 0,2368*** (0,0413) 0,2480*** (0,0743) -0,3256*** (0,0916) 15,7465*** (2,5474)
Bachelor edu. 0,2119*** (0,0753) 0,3228** (0,1378) -0,2751* (0,1567) 16,6568*** (4,3946)
Long-cycle higher edu. 0,2715*** (0,0465) 0,4135*** (0,0845) -0,5974*** (0,1103) 28,9744*** (2,8515)
Immig. western country -0,0285 (0,0351) -0,1379** (0,0603) 0,1742** (0,0688) -4,2816** (2,1681)
Immig. non-western country -0,1451*** (0,0199) -0,1789*** (0,0323) 0,0005 (0,0384) -0,9507 (1,2476)
Descendant western country 0,0983 (0,1054) -0,1597 (0,1618) 0,2234 (0,1782) 5,5486 (6,1442)
Desc. non-western country -0,0759 (0,0597) -0,2848*** (0,0858) 0,1920** (0,0917) -0,9383 (3,6665)
Agr., fishing, quarr. -0,0116 (0,0293) 0,1016** (0,0512) -0,0700 (0,0594) -0,7637 (1,7734)
Manufacturing -0,03882 (0,0306) 0,1290** (0,0563) -0,1410** (0,0649) 5,1547*** (1,8103)
Electricity, gas and water  -0,0822** (0,0384) 0,1674** (0,0754) -0,1103 (0,0858) -0,0476 (2,1976)
Construction 0,0182 (0,0318) 0,0023 (0,0555) -0,0882 (0,0649) 10,9907*** (1,8867)
Rtrade, hotel and restaurants 0,0440* (0,0262) -0,1397*** (0,0415) 0,1077** (0,0517) -3,4236** (1,5864)
Transport, post and telecom 0,0481 (0,0325) -0,0428 (0,0560) 0,0925 (0,0634) 4,9436** (1,9182)
Finance and business  -0,0750*** (0,0255) -0,0417 -0,0455 0,0565 (0,0521) 1,5470 (1,5707)
Public and personal service 0,0354 (0,0259) 0,0337 -0,0469 0,0203 (0,0539) -4,7501*** (1,5886)
Self-employed 0,0131 (0,0256) -0,7417*** -0,0386 -0,0005 (0,0506) 3,9452** (1,7378)
Top manager -0,0026 (0,0970) 0,2089 -0,1996 -0,1377 (0,2373) 43,0359*** (5,2375)
Employees upper level 0,0711** (0,0320) 0,1216** -0,0586 -0,1920*** (0,0736) 18,4719*** (1,9214)
Employees medium level -0,0066 (0,0272) 0,0939* -0,0507 -0,1542** (0,0618) 7,9732*** (1,5388)
Employees basic level -0,003 (0,0130) 0,1228** -0,0222 -0,1245*** (0,0246) -0,0885 (0,7730)
No work experience -0,1163** (0,0456) -0,1928*** -0,0696 0,0966 (0,0801) -7,4378** (3,6297)
From 6 years to 10 years 0,1068*** (0,0162) 0,2131*** -0,0289 -0,2117 (0,0339) 5,5379*** (0,9659)
More than 11 years  0,1973*** (0,0189) 0,3764*** -0,0349  -0,4141*** (0,0431)  8,2489*** (1,1237)
Hazard Lambda - - - - - - 17,2510*** (1,7879)
Athrho 0,3305*** (0,0303) 0,9361*** (0,0397) -0,8532*** (0,0407) - - 
LR test of rho=0                        Prob > chi2= 0.0000        Prob > chi2= 0.0000         Prob > chi2= 0.0000 
 
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign.at the 1% level (α = 0,01) 
(1) Seemingly unrelated bivariate  probit. Method of adjustment: Full Information Maximum Likelihood.   
(2) Treatment effects. Method of adjustment: Two-step Maximum Likelihood. 
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Table A3. Post-Program effects of education/training programs 
 
Ind. variables/Dep. variables Job finding rate (1) Extent of working time (1) Individual earning (2) 
  Transitions to work Transitions to full-time Transitions to part-time Wage levels 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
Effects of training 0,5480*** (0,0324) 1,5813*** (0,0238) -1,7910*** (0,0275) 19,2522*** (2,2501)
[18-25] 0,4143*** (0,0261) -0,0123 (0,0427) 0,1283*** (0,0493) -6,5627*** (1,5381)
[26-30] 0,1870*** (0,0250) 0,0941** (0,0415) -0,0049 (0,0488) 4,5756*** (1,4294)
[31-35] 0,1437*** (0,0244) 0,0873** (0,0408) -0,0072 (0,0483) 4,7688*** (1,3717)
[36-40] 0,0769*** (0,0240) 0,0580 (0,0405) -0,0456 (0,0492) 2,9738** (1,3549)
[41-45] 0,0821*** (0,0249) 0,0586 (0,0422) 0,0105 (0,0504) 3,3755** (1,3928)
[51+] -0,4192*** (0,0227) -0,0408 (0,0404) 0,0247 (0,0487) 1,8887 (1,3799)
Female -0,0098 (0,0126) 0,0199 (0,0201) 0,0679*** (0,0225) -17,5854*** (0,7338)
Couples with children 0,1057*** (0,0156) -0,0049 (0,0251) -0,0861*** (0,0291) -1,7093* (0,8859)
Couples without children 0,1023*** (0,0149) 0,0244 (0,0239) -0,0425 (0,0261) -0,6018 (0,8716)
Singles with children -0,0988*** (0,0235) 0,0677 (0,0412) -0,1706*** (0,0475) -2,6281* (1,3967)
Basic school/preparatory 0,0304 (0,0331) 0,0702 (0,0540) -0,0572 (0,0601) -4,4987** (2,1040)
General upper secondary 0,2875*** (0,0370) -0,1591*** (0,0583) 0,1386** (0,0643) -2,8131 (2,3356)
Vocational train. edu. 0,1520*** (0,0338) 0,1163** (0,0553) -0,1148* (0,0617) 0,8014 (2,1281)
Short-cycle higher edu. 0,2181*** (0,0440) 0,0277 (0,0708) -0,1294 (0,0841) 7,9689*** (2,6670)
Med.-cycle higher edu. 0,2274**** (0,0410) 0,0509 (0,0675) -0,0990 (0,0793) 14,6011*** (2,5075)
Bachelor edu. 0,2164*** (0,0740) 0,1694 (0,1252) -0,1040 (0,1368) 16,7125*** (4,3106)
Long cycle higher edu. 0,2548*** (0,0462) 0,0839 (0,0758) -0,1692* (0,0927) 27,9760*** (2,8104)
Immig. western country -0,0021 (0,0348) -0,0729 (0,0558) 0,1017* (0,0616) -2,9160 (2,1239)
Immig. non-western country -0,1332*** (0,0195) -0,2262*** (0,0302) 0,0762** (0,0350) 0,5139 (1,2102)
Descendant western country 0,1116 (0,1046) -0,1227 (0,1567) 0,1631 (0,1732) 4,2494 (6,0246)
Desc. non-western country 0,0059 (0,0591) -0,1612* (0,0825) 0,0835 (0,0871) 3,6880 (3,5652)
Agr., fishing, quarr. -0,0258 (0,0292) 0,0379 (0,0474) 0,0050 (0,0535) -1,5105 (1,7389)
Manufacturing -0,0398 (0,0304) 0,0410 (0,0515) -0,0381 (0,0580) 5,2268*** (1,7748)
Electricity, gas and water  -0,0952** (0,0381) -0,0004 (0,0686) 0,0775 (0,0762) -0,3820 (2,1632)
Construction 0,0397 (0,0316) 0,0199 (0,0513) -0,0925 (0,0581) 11,5254*** (1,8503)
Rtrade, hotel and restaurants 0,0748*** (0,0259) -0,0540 (0,0418) 0,0065 (0,0467) -1,6734 (1,5530)
Transport, post and telecom 0,0770** (0,0322) 0,0276 (0,0518) 0,0138 (0,0571) 6,5191*** (1,8836)
Finance and business  -0,0673*** (0,0254) 0,0088 (0,0419) -0,0052 (0,0469) 1,5670 (1,5422)
Public and personal service 0,0090 (0,0258) -0,0480 (0,0429) 0,1100** (0,0478) -6,7599*** (1,5516)
Self-employed 0,0502** (0,0253) -0,6040*** (0,0369) -0,0700 (0,0464) 6,3977*** (1,6907)
Top manager 0,0444 (0,0961) 0,1939 (0,1723) -0,1398 (0,1995) 44,5148*** (5,1319)
Employees upper level 0,1080*** (0,0313) 0,0746 (0,0512) -0,0918 (0,0608) 20,3059*** (1,8725)
Employees medium level 0,0258 (0,0267) 0,0529 (0,0448) -0,1224** (0,0541) 10,0338*** (1,4914)
Employees basic level -0,0070*** (0,0129) 0,0494** (0,0209) -0,0398* (0,0227) 0,2923 (0,7595)
No work experience -0,1240*** (0,0455) -0,2186*** (0,0675) 0,1193 (0,0765) -7,7099** (3,5579)
From 6 years to 10 years 0,0821*** (0,0163) 0,0572** (0,0268) -0,0333 (0,0305) 4,9337*** (0,9638)
More than 11 years  0,1751*** (0,0190) 0,1270*** (0,0321) -0,1151*** (0,0376) 7,7716*** (1,1267)
Hazard Lambda - - - - - - -9,0882*** (1,4205) 
Athrho -0,3864*** (0,0237) -1,4480*** (0,0085) 1,5915*** (0,0429) - - 
LR test of rho=0                          Prob > chi2= 0.0000        Prob > chi2= 0.0000         Prob > chi2= 0.000 
 
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign. at the 1% level (α = 0,01) 
(1) Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit. Method of adjustment: Full Information Maximum Likelihood.   
(2) Treatment effects. Method of adjustment: Two-step Maximum Likelihood. 
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Table A4. Post-Program effects of services/sanctions programs 
 
 
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign.at the 1% level (α = 0,01) 
(1) Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit. Method of adjustment: Full Information Maximum Likelihood.   
(2) Treatment effects. Method of adjustment: Two-step Maximum Likelihood. 
Ind. variables/Dep. variables Job finding rate (1) Extent of working time (1) Individual earnings (2) 
  Transitions to work Transitions to full-time Transitions to part-time Wage level 
 Coef. Std Err. Coef. Std Err. Coef. Std Err. Coef. Std Err.
Effects of services/sanc. 0,4439*** (0,0500) 1,3960*** (0,0217) -1,5332*** (0,0236) 12,7363*** (3,0047)
[18-25] 0,3791*** (0,0262) -0,1027** (0,0418) 0,2419*** (0,0475) -7,5728*** (1,5332)
[26-30] 0,1998*** (0,0252) 0,12054*** (0,0408) -0,0074 (0,0468) 5,0328*** (1,4342)
[31-35] 0,1473*** (0,0246) 0,0741* (0,0399) 0,0199 (0,0463) 4,8320*** (1,3692)
[36-40] 0,0748*** (0,0242) 0,0118 (0,0396) 0,0405 (0,0466) 2,8072** (1,3511)
[41-45] 0,0801*** (0,0251) 0,0183 (0,0413) 0,0655 (0,0483) 3,1277** (1,3885)
[51+] -0,4589*** (0,0228) -0,0993** (0,0397) 0,1171** (0,0468) 1,1384 (1,3779)
Female 0,012 (0,0126) 0,0205 (0,0198) 0,0617*** (0,0215) -17,1722*** (0,7344)
Couples with children 0,1623*** (0,0152) 0,1482*** (0,0244) -0,2410*** (0,0274) -0,0910 (0,8636)
Couples without children 0,1286*** (0,0149) 0,0873*** (0,0233) -0,1043*** (0,0250) 0,2939 (0,8633)
Singles with children -0,0734*** (0,0236) 0,1108*** (0,0398) -0,1988*** (0,0439) -2,1648 (1,3929)
Basic school/preparatory 0,0191 (0,0333) 0,0434 (0,0538) -0,0144 (0,0590) -4,7142** (2,0978)
General upper secondary 0,2538*** (0,0373) -0,2767*** (0,0579) 0,2808*** (0,0630) -3,8561* (2,3266)
Vocational train. edu. 0,1552*** (0,0341) 0,0922* (0,0550) -0,0773 (0,0604) 0,8687 (2,1241)
Short-cycle higher edu. 0,2194*** (0,0445) -0,0241 (0,0702) -0,0296 (0,0802) 8,4993*** (2,6640)
Med.-cycle higher edu. 0,2591*** (0,0413) 0,1286* (0,0668) -0,1613** (0,0765) 16,3545*** (2,4899)
Bachelor edu. 0,2685*** (0,0751) 0,2501** (0,1214) -0,1919 (0,1325) 18,5247*** (4,2926)
Long cycle higher edu. 0,2963*** (0,0466) 0,2167*** (0,0748) -0,2726*** (0,0881) 30,0199*** (2,7892)
Immig. western country 0,0075 (0,0351) 0,0256 (0,0553) 0,0013 (0,0595) -2,6468 (2,1221)
Immig. non-western country -0,0585*** (0,0195) 0,0236 (0,0300) -0,1615*** (0,0336) 2,8340** (1,2027)
Descendant western country 0,1114 (0,1054) -0,0112 (0,1519) 0,0392 (0,1661) 5,9289 (6,0071)
Desc. non-western country -0,0021 (0,0594) -0,1227 (0,0810) 0,0665 (0,0838) 4,3086 (3,5543)
Agr., fishing, quarr. 0,0108 (0,0294) 0,1352*** (0,0465) -0,1200** (0,0512) -0,7971 (1,7348)
Manufacturing -0,0157 (0,0306) 0,1757*** (0,0504) -0,1816*** (0,0553) 5,8876*** (1,7697)
Electricity, gas and water  -0,034 (0,0383) 0,2327*** (0,0663) -0,1815** (0,0716) 2,0396 (2,1442)
Construction 0,0371 (0,0319) 0,0150 (0,0502) -0,0740 (0,0551) 10,8368*** (1,8448)
Rtrade, hotel and restaurants 0,0709*** (0,0261) -0,0762* (0,0408) 0,0388 (0,0444) -2,7113* (1,5495)
Transport, post and telecom 0,0813** (0,0324) 0,0115 (0,0507) 0,0237 (0,0548) 5,6127*** (1,8747)
Finance and business  -0,0756*** (0,0256) -0,0106 (0,0409) 0,0139 (0,0446) 0,5497 (1,5329)
Public and personal service 0,0318 (0,0260) 0,0657 (0,0418) -0,0226 (0,0455) -6,0557*** (1,5489)
Self-employed 0,0424* (0,0255) -0,6165*** (0,0366) 0,0102 (0,0440) 6,0338*** (1,6886)
Top manager 0,0108 (0,0970) 0,0049 (0,1646) 0,1086 (0,1774) 43,4000*** (5,1298)
Employees upper level 0,0988*** (0,0320) -0,0115 (0,0500) -0,0380 (0,0588) 20,3505*** (1,8751)
Employees medium level 0,0357 (0,0269) 0,0621 (0,0433) -0,1021** (0,0440) 10,5170*** (1,4870)
Employees basic level 0,0149 (0,0129) 0,1148*** (0,0204) -0,1091*** (0,0217) 1,3986* (0,7439)
No work experience -0,1079** (0,0458) -0,1211* (0,0670) 0,0056 (0,0748) -7,9482** (3,5478)
From 6 years to 10 years 0,1235*** (0,0162) 0,1857*** (0,0260) -0,1645*** (0,0286) 6,7327*** (0,9394)
More than 11 years 0,2368*** (0,0186) 0,3499*** (0,0309) -0,3523*** (0,0352) 10,5764*** (1,0881)
Hazard Lambda - - - - - - -7,4075*** (1,7792)
Athrho -0,2567*** (0,0318) -1,6127*** (0,0556) 1,8214*** (0,0533) - - 
LR test of rho=0      Prob> chi2= 0.0000        Prob> chi2= 0.0000         Prob> chi2= 0.000
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Table A5.  Multinomial logit with selection for private sector employment programs 
 
 
 
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign.at the 1% level (α = 0,01) 
Ind. variables/Dep.var. Job finding rate Extent of working time Individual earning 
  Transitions to work Transitions to full-time Trans. to part-time Wage levels 
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
[18-25] 0,1669*** (0,0360) -0,0287 (0,0286) 0,0639*** (0,0242) -0,1636 (3,9062) 
[26-30] 0,0360 (0,0347) -0,0212 (0,0272) 0,0466** (0,0230) 2,8505 (3,674) 
[31-35] -0,0003 (0,0340) -0,0367 (0,0265) 0,0366 (0,0224) 5,7053 (3,5607) 
[36-40] -0,0435 (0,0335) -0,0175 (0,0264) 0,0238 (0,0223) 1,1382 (3,5677) 
[41-45] 0,0599* (0,0345) -0,0086 (0,0262) 0,0144 (0,0222) 6,4695* (3,5291) 
[51+] -0,0861** (0,0361) 0,0267 (0,0294) -0,0299 (0,0249) 7,3067* (3,9890) 
Female 0,0405** (0,0205) -0,0318* (0,0161) 0,0311** (0,0137) -15,8155*** (2,2237) 
Couples with children 0,0672*** (0,0214) -0,0091 (0,0161) -0,0004 (0,0143) -0,2098 (2,3135) 
Couples without children 0,0490** (0,0214) -0,0055 (0,0170) 0,0019 (0,0144) -3,0179 (2,3349) 
Singles with children -0,0043 (0,0341) 0,0268 (0,0280) -0,0267 (0,0237) 0,0889 (3,8468) 
Basic school/preparatory -0,0657 (0,0453) 0,0168 (0,0347) -0,0171 (0,0294) 3,2878 (4,8331) 
General upper secondary 0,0404 (0,0531) -0,0281 (0,0403) 0,0180 (0,0341) 1,8333 (5,6879) 
Vocational train. edu. -0,0678 (0,0462) -0,0001 (0,0354) -0,0072 (0,0299) 2,475 (4,9185) 
Short-cycle higher edu. -0,0309 (0,0614) -0,0127 (0,0471) 0,0390 (0,0398) -2,0663 (6,6010) 
Med.-cycle higher edu. -0,0658 (0,0633) 0,0222 (0,0499) -0,0006 (0,0423) 7,5589 (7,0481) 
Bachelor edu. -0,0563 (0,1143) -0,0647 (0,0887) 0,0892 (0,0751) 24,3257* (13,2650)
Long cycle higher edu. -0,1066 (0,0728) 0,0218 (0,0585) 0,0015 (0,0495) 12,6798 (7,9160) 
Imm.western country 0,0266 (0,0481) -0,0766** (0,0380) 0,0522 (0,0322) -2,7854 (5,3037) 
Immig. non-west country  0,0139 (0,0282) -0,1106*** (0,0222) 0,0755*** (0,0188) -3,5702 (3,1292) 
Descendant west country  0,1345 (0,1821) 0,1794 (0,1314) -0,1460 (0,1112) -14,838 (16,4099)
Desc.non-west country 0,0173 (0,0994) -0,036 (0,0769) -0,0083 (0,0651) -7,0751 (11,7373)
Agr., fishing, quarr.  0,0599 (0,0440) -0,0608* (0,0361) 0,0326 (0,0305) -0,4021 (4,9592) 
Manufacturing 0,0027 (0,0470) -0,1099*** (0,0385) 0,0739** (0,0326) -1,6497 (5,2784) 
Electricity, gas and water  -0,0475 (0,0540) -0,1212*** (0,0445) 0,0940** (0,0377) -3,7884 (6,0173) 
Construction -0,0077 (0,0474) -0,0720* (0,0395) 0,0416 (0,0334) 1,4215 (5,4195) 
Rtrade, hotel a restaurants  0,0429 (0,0468) -0,1346*** (0,0383) 0,0994*** (0,0324) -6,8135 (5,2922) 
Transport, post, telecom 0,0444 (0,0492) -0,0873** (0,0400) 0,0332 (0,0338) 6,9395 (5,4201) 
Finance and business 0,0185 (0,0389) -0,0057 (0,0327) -0,0194 (0,0277) 0,8670 (4,4692) 
Public and personal service 0,1002** (0,0458) 0,0570 (0,0376) -0,0628** (0,0318) 6,2642 (5,1487) 
Self-employed -0,1057 (0,0354) -0,0705 (0,0279) 0,0109 (0,0236) -5,0187 (3,9252) 
Top manager -0,0226 (0,1459) 0,0306 (0,1116) -0,0173 (0,0945) 11,4294 (13,9413)
Employees upper level 0,0432 (0,0564) -0,0926** (0,0439) 0,0556 (0,0371) 11,7272* (6,1000) 
Employees medium level -0,0540 (0,0408) -0,0762 (0,0321) 0,0587** (0,0271) 5,3697 (4,3088) 
Employees basic level -0,0169 (0,0174) -0,0011 (0,0137) 0,0110 (0,0116) -3,6035* (1,9019) 
No work experience -0,0446 (0,0667) -0,1203 (0,0770) -0,0997 (0,0652) -13,3026 (13,3138)
From 6 years to 10 years 0,0601*** (0,0217) -0,0139 (0,0177) 0,0267* (0,0149) 2,2012 (2,4370) 
More than 11 years  0,1030*** (0,0256) -0,0461** (0,0206)  0,0621*** (0,0174) 2,4830 (2,8259) 
m1 -0,1576** (0,0667) -0,1499*** (0,0529) 0,1769*** (0,0448) -5,6034 (7,2297) 
m2 0,5676* (0,3101) 1,0788*** (0,2515) -0,7747*** (0,2129) 119,716*** (35,4267)
m3 0,1077 (0,3017) 0,2622 (0,2449) -0,0591 (0,2074) 81,0641** (34,4748)
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Table A6. Multinomial logit with selection for public sector employment programs 
 
 
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign. at the 1% level (α = 0,01) 
Ind. variables/Dep.var. Job finding rate Extent of working time Individual earning 
  Transitions to work Transitions to full-time Trans. to part-time Wage levels 
 Coeff. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
[18-25] 0,1661*** (0,0233) 0,0238 (0,0296) 0,0233 (0,0276) -8,9199** (3,5331) 
[26-30] 0,0539** (0,0240) 0,0075 (0,0296) 0,0162 (0,0276) 3,8998 (3,5152) 
[31-35] 0,0262 (0,0241) -0,0164 (0,0294) 0,0432 (0,0274) 6,8981** (3,4518) 
[36-40] 0,0247 (0,0236) -0,0393 (0,0287) 0,0556** (0,0267) 4,1376 (3,3486) 
[41-45] 0,0177 (0,0239) -0,0167 (0,0290) 0,0219 (0,0270) 1,5442 (3,3769) 
[51+] -0,1638*** (0,0221) 0,0781*** (0,0290) -0,0618** (0,0270) 6,2402* (3,3960) 
Female 0,0262** (0,0127) -0,0108 (0,0156) 0,0348** (0,0146) -15,4157*** (1,9013) 
Couples with children 0,0268* (0,0141) 0,00008 (0,0174) -0,0226 (0,0162) -1,9559 (2,0560) 
Couples without children 0,0205 (0,0133) -0,0143 (0,0163) 0,0038 (0,0152) -5,2300*** (1,9668) 
Singles with children -0,0453** (0,0198) 0,0592** (0,0256) -0,0639*** (0,0238) -5,1914* (2,9727) 
Basic school/preparatory 0,0553* (0,0287) 0,1107*** (0,0404) -0,0848** (0,0377) -6,5344 (5,2786) 
General upper secondary 0,1848*** (0,0322) 0,0132 (0,0435) 0,0075 (0,0406) -13,6006** (5,7235) 
Vocational train.edu. 0,0958*** (0,0298) 0,0811* (0,0415) -0,0533 (0,0387) -3,0500 (5,3793) 
Short-cycle higher edu. 0,0878* (0,0454) 0,0577 (0,0579) -0,0509 (0,0540) 0,2272 (7,1626) 
Med.-cycle higher edu. 0,1056** (0,0409) 0,0909* (0,0536) -0,0332 (0,0500) 7,6085 (6,6866) 
Bachelor edu. 0,1873** (0,0928) 0,0107 (0,1019) 0,0486 (0,0950) 0,7905 (13,0829)
Long cycle higher edu. 0,1056** (0,0521) 0,0944 (0,0653) -0,0319 (0,0609) 24,0475*** (7,9994) 
Immig. western country -0,0020 (0,0033) -0,0171 (0,0430) -0,0010 (0,0401) -3,6289 (5,2052) 
Immig. non-western country -0,0289 (0,0198) -0,1031*** (0,0247) 0,0372 (0,0230) -3,7911 (3,1259) 
Descendant western country -0,0400 (0,0928) 0,0500 (0,1223) 0,0316 (0,1141) -3,2529 (13,2398)
Desc. non-western country -0,1127** (0,0555) -0,0615 (0,0736) 0,0077 (0,0686) 2,9952 (9,1736) 
Agriculture, fishing, quarr. 0,0544** (0,0259) -0,1115*** (0,0330) 0,1035*** (0,0307) -2,3399 (4,0219) 
Manufacturing 0,0006 (0,0294) -0,1125*** (0,0376) 0,1027*** (0,0351) 3,2725 (4,4897) 
Electricity, gas and water  -0,0661* (0,0368) -0,1348*** (0,0482) 0,1327*** (0,0449) 4,4301 (5,6318) 
Construction 0,0252 (0,0288) -0,0592 (0,0373) 0,0518 (0,0348) 6,183 (4,4137) 
Rtrade, hotel and restaurants 0,0244 (0,0279) -0,1745*** (0,0356) 0,1552*** (0,0332) -5,6884 (4,3380) 
Transport, post and telecom 0,0811*** (0,0308) -0,1429*** (0,0382) 0,1322*** (0,0356) 2,2708 (4,6162) 
Finance and business  0,0132 (0,0208) -0,0345 (0,0283) 0,0248 (0,0263) 3,2452 (3,3815) 
Public and personal service 0,0633*** (0,0228) -0,0159 (0,0306) 0,0035 (0,0283) 2,6531 (3,6211) 
Self-employed -0,0011 (0,0241) -0,2501*** (0,0295) 0,0233 (0,0275) 8,2841* (4,3006) 
Top manager 0,1144 (0,1241) -0,0738 (0,1286) 0,0936 (0,1199) 3,4404 (14,0006)
Employees upper level -0,001 (0,0402) -0,1131** (0,0460) 0,0250 (0,0429) 2,2859 (5,5480) 
Employees medium level -0,0022 (0,0309) -0,0178 (0,0368) -0,0111 (0,0343) 2,3203 (4,2135) 
Employees basic level -0,0074 (0,0103) 0,0120 (0,0127) -0,0174 (0,0119) -2,0683 (1,5441) 
No work experience -0,0081 (0,0394) -0,0054 (0,0488) 0,0596 (0,0455) -3,4198 (7,3533) 
From 6 years to 10 years 0,0535*** (0,0146) 0,0324* (0,0185) -0,0193 (0,0173) 4,4533** (2,2519) 
More than 11 years  0,0662*** (0,0175) 0,0462** (0,0226)  -0,0112 (0,0211) 3,9096 (2,7181) 
m1 -0,1864 (0,1710) -0,8546*** (0,2054) 0,7831*** (0,1915) -56,1796** (24,5607)
m2 0,2650*** (0,0524) 0,1520** (0,0627) -0,1748*** (0,0585) 6,9423 (7,7222) 
m3 0,2526** (0,1190) -0,5724*** (0,1441) 0,3975*** (0,1343) -6,8302 (17,6018)
m4 0,2948*** (0,0811) -0,2452** (0,0959) 0,1489 (0,0894) -9,1349 (11,9364)
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Table A7. Multinomial logit with selection for education/training programs 
 
 
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign.at the 1% level (α = 0,01) 
Ind. variables/Dep. variables Job finding rate Extent of working time Individual earning 
  Transitions to work Transitions to full-time Trans. to part-time Wage levels 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
[18-25] 0,1088*** (0,0191) 0,0313** (0,0147) 0,0071 (0,0095) 1,8929 (2,8007) 
[26-30] 0,0251 (0,0164) 0,0060 (0,0125) 0,0167** (0,0081) 4,2708* (2,3659) 
[31-35] 0,0253 (0,0157) -0,0014 (0,0118) 0,0122 (0,0077) 2,0739 (2,2363) 
[36-40] -0,0075 (0,0152) -0,0112 (0,0114) 0,0158** (0,0074) 2,7391 (2,1621) 
[41-45] 0,0065 (0,0152) 0,0027 (0,0114) 0,0079 (0,0074) 4,1712* (2,1430) 
[51+] -0,1379*** (0,0155) 0,0217* (0,0123) -0,0166 (0,0080) 3,816 (2,3766) 
Female -0,0065 (0,0098) 0,0218*** (0,0076) 0,0043 (0,0050) -19,9087*** (1,4555) 
Couples with children 0,0476*** (0,0102) -0,0195** (0,0079) 0,0052 (0,0051) -2,3446 (1,4949) 
Couples without children 0,0230** (0,0104) -0,0190** (0,0083) 0,0103* (0,0054) -0,8866 (1,5792) 
Singles with children -0,0327** (0,0152) -0,0207* (0,0123) -0,0053 (0,0080) -4,8621** (2,3198) 
Basic school/preparatory 0,0247 (0,0220) 0,0317* (0,0187) -0,0100 (0,0122) -3,9141 (3,6246) 
General upper secondary 0,0453* (0,0258) -0,0263 (0,0215) 0,0397*** (0,0149) 0,2588 (4,2277) 
Vocational train. edu. 0,0493** (0,0224) 0,0141 (0,0189) -0,0008 (0,0123) 1,4063 (3,6661) 
Short-cycle higher edu. 0,0700** (0,0281) -0,0143 (0,0229) 0,0123 (0,0149 7,3393* (4,4306) 
Med.-cycle higher edu. 0,1008*** (0,0260) 0,0963 (0,0212) 0,0047 (0,0138) 15,6679*** (4,1033) 
Bachelor edu. 0,0489 (0,0457) 0,0316 (0,0357) 0,0126 (0,0232) 20,3571*** (6,9156) 
Long cycle higher edu. 0,1199*** (0,0290) 0,0029 (0,0232) 0,0114 (0,0150) 32,8998*** (4,5663) 
Immig. western country -0,0198 (0,0231) -0,0423** (0,0183) 0,0401*** (0,0119) -13,0934*** (3,6503) 
Immig. non-western country -0,0653*** (0,0137) -0,1036*** (0,0111) 0,0309*** (0,0072) 1,8524 (2,1748) 
Descendant western country 0,1550** (0,0725) 0,0395 (0,0491) -0,0155 (0,0320) 18,9305* (9,6679) 
Desc. non-western country 0,0525 (0,0512) -0,1259*** (0,0371) 0,0885*** (0,0241) 5,8481 (7,3373) 
Agr., fishing, quarr. -0,0558*** (0,0204) -0,0004 (0,0160) 0,0111 (0,0104) -1,5317 (3,0704) 
Manufacturing -0,0473** (0,0224) -0,0151 (0,0174) 0,0197* (0,0113) 5,7075* (3,2943) 
Electricity, gas and water  -0,0354 (0,0252) -0,0184 (0,0194) 0,0266** (0,0126) -0,1660 (3,5622) 
Construction -0,0214 (0,0221) -0,0538*** (0,0187) 0,0362*** (0,0121) 15,0392*** (3,5419) 
Rtrade, hotel and restaurants -0,0447** (0,0221) -0,0593*** (0,0172) 0,0319*** (0,0112) -4,1844 (3,3233) 
Transport, post and telecom -0,0546** (0,0238) -0,0396** (0,0187) 0,0458*** (0,0121) 2,8968 (3,5719) 
Finance and business  -0,0570*** (0,0172) -0,0003 (0,0136) -0,0030 (0,0088) 0,2629 (2,6200) 
Public and personal service 0,0465** (0,0180) 0,0137 (0,0139) -0,0036 (0,0091) -5,6043 (2,6993) 
Self-employed 0,0355** (0,0172) -0,2980*** (0,0137) -0,0058 (0,0089) 3,6957 (3,0301) 
Top manager 0,0018 (0,0589) 0,0160 (0,0441) -0,0067 (0,0287) 54,8616*** (8,1702) 
Employees upper level 0,0296 (0,0201) -0,0092 (0,0150) 0,0068 (0,0098) 26,4278*** (3,0177) 
Employees medium level 0,0032 (0,0173) -0,0210 (0,0132) 0,0174** (0,0086) 10,7030*** (2,5018) 
Employees basic level 0,0025 (0,0090) 0,0047 (0,0071) 0,0015 (0,0046) 1,0187 (1,3426) 
No work experience -0,0084 (0,0338) -0,1569*** (0,0292) -0,0157 (0,0190) 0,4994 (7,3859) 
From 6 years to 10 years 0,0377*** (0,0104) 0,0076 (0,0082) -0,0020 (0,0053) 6,3196*** (1,5750) 
More than 11 years  0,0768*** (0,0123) 0,0131 (0,0097)  -0,0013 (0,0063)  10,3190*** (1,8582) 
m1 -0,4408*** (0,1362) -0,4652*** (0,1041) 0,4217*** (0,0677) -22,8460 (19,6813)
m2 0,3730*** (0,1394) 0,0783 (0,1107) 0,0397 (0,0720) -3,9506 (21,2973)
m3 0,0620 (0,0583) -0,3223*** (0,0469) 0,3125*** (0,0305) -14,4426 (9,0789) 
m4 0,1017 (0,0867) -0,3545*** (0,0686) 0,3858*** (0,0446) -18,2823 (13,1576)
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Table A8. Multinomial logit with selection for services/sanctions programs 
 
 
*significance at the 10% level (α = 0,1) **sign. at the 5% level (α = 0,05) ***sign.at the 1% level (α = 0,01) 
 
Ind. variables/Dep. variables Job finding rate Extent of workig time Individual earning 
  Transitions to work Transitions to full-time Trans. to part-time Wage levels 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
[18-25] 0,1417*** (0,0244) 0,0077 (0,0230) 0,0428** (0,0167) -5,3246 (3,8161) 
[26-30] 0,0404* (0,0218) 0,0074 (0,0204) 0,0093 (0,0148) 2,2436 (3,3701) 
[31-35] 0,0335 (0,0210) 0,0089 (0,0195) 0,0089 (0,0142) 1,0010 (3,2149) 
[36-40] 0,0165 (0,0204) 0,0012 (0,0190) -0,0027 (0,0138) 0,6430 (3,1335) 
[41-45] 0,0288 (0,0205) 0,0126 (0,0190) 0,0088 (0,0138) -0,0953 (3,1093) 
[51+] -0,1691*** (0,0192) 0,0415** (0,0191) -0,0491*** (0,0139) 1,3207 (3,2187) 
Female 0,0390*** (0,0120) 0,0201* (0,0117) 0,0019 (0,0085) -15,9837*** (1,9770) 
Couples with children 0,0716*** (0,0134) -0,0188 (0,0127) 0,0016 (0,0092) -2,245 (2,0942) 
Couples without children 0,0479*** (0,0127) -0,0232* (0,0124) 0,0105 (0,0090) -0,8303 (2,0840) 
Singles with children -0,0058 (0,0203) 0,0192 (0,0196) -0,0303** (0,0143) 0,9350 (3,2218) 
Basic school/preparatory -0,0141 (0,0321) 0,0595* (0,0324) -0,0735*** (0,0236) -1,0912 (5,4707) 
General upper secondary 0,0628* (0,0356) -0,0393 (0,0354) 0,0085 (0,0257) 4,6252 (6,0852) 
Vocational train. edu. 0,0329 (0,0328) 0,0380 (0,0331) -0,0532** (0,0240) -1,4825 (5,5499) 
Short-cycle higher edu. 0,0675* (0,0386) 0,0187 (0,0382) -0,0376 (0,0277) 10,0751 (6,4311) 
Med.-cycle higher edu. 0,0690* (0,0369) 0,0170 (0,0366) -0,0516* (0,0266) 18,3002*** (6,2083) 
Bachelor edu. 0,0592 (0,0631) 0,0112 (0,0582) -0,0014 (0,0423) 18,1795* (10,0884)
Long cycle higher edu. 0,0723* (0,0396) 0,0292 (0,0388) -0,0559** (0,0282) 25,2783*** (6,6485) 
Immig. western country -0,0662** (0,0288) -0,0471 (0,0299) 0,0575*** (0,0217) 3,0959 (5,1518) 
Immig. non-western country -0,0380* (0,0194) -0,1288*** (0,0187) 0,0562*** (0,0136) -2,1459 (3,2946) 
Descendant western country -0,0267 (0,0867) 0,0687 (0,0813) -0,0422 (0,0591) -8,3820 (14,9796)
Desc. non-western country -0,0374 (0,0522) -0,1424*** (0,0479) 0,1540*** (0,0348) -10,3627 (8,6617) 
Agr., fishing, quarr. -0,0228 (0,0262) -0,0099 (0,0249) 0,0452** (0,0181) -4,7716 (4,2536) 
Manufacturing -0,0891*** (0,0275) -0,0346 (0,0270) 0,0609*** (0,0196) -1,0879 (4,5001) 
Electricity, gas and water  -0,0477 (0,0341) -0,0329 (0,0329) 0,0555** (0,0239) -8,8757* (5,2788) 
Construction -0,0068 (0,0287) -0,0599** (0,0271) 0,0363* (0,0197) 6,1300 (4,5497) 
Rtrade, hotel and restaurants -0,0016 (0,0261) -0,0654 (0,0246) 0,0674*** (0,0179) -11,0798*** (4,2604) 
Transport, post and telecom -0,0237 (0,0285) -0,0563** (0,0274) 0,0845*** (0,0199) -0,8046 (4,6204) 
Finance and business  -0,0552*** (0,0208) 0,0115 (0,0200) 0,0163 (0,0145) 0,5351 (3,4993) 
Public and personal service 0,0015 (0,0221) 0,0542** (0,0211) -0,0163 (0,0153) -6,9907* (3,7261) 
Self-employed 0,0430* (0,0219) -0,2811*** (0,0208) -0,0070 (0,0151) 3,1522 (3,9142) 
Top manager 0,0483 (0,0646) 0,0594 (0,0617) -0,0207 (0,0449) 36,0830*** (9,6172) 
Employees upper level 0,0426* (0,0247) -0,2103 (0,0231) 0,0522*** (0,0168) 1,8802 (4,1893) 
Employees medium level -0,0068 (0,0216) -0,0296 (0,0206) 0,0210 (0,0150) 1,4688 (3,4207) 
Employees basic level -0,0091 (0,0115) 0,0097 (0,0111) -0,0052 (0,0080) 1,6992 (1,8358) 
No work experience -0,0676 (0,0444) -0,0224 (0,0462) 0,0160 (0,0336) -16,6530* (8,7493) 
From 6 years to 10 years 0,0173 (0,0136) 0,0220* (0,0129) -0,0019 (0,0093) 4,4861** (2,1513) 
More than 11 years 0,0297* (0,0155) 0,0066 (0,0151)  0,0165 (0,0109)  7,1671*** (2,5187) 
m1 -0,4643*** (0,1711) -0,8133*** (0,1600) 0,6853*** (0,1163) 17,6112 (26,5145)
m2 -0,0960 (0,1738) 0,1514 (0,1712) -0,2372* (0,1245) 95,5652*** (28,4773)
m3 -0,1960 (0,1764) -0,6883*** (0,1751) 0,5332*** (0,1273) 60,6412** (29,0914)
m4 -0,0868* (0,0477) -0,1515*** (0,0465) 0,1345*** (0,0338) 8,9383 (7,6556)
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Table A9. Labour market integration 
 
 
Job finding rate: p(A) p(B|A) 
Private sector employment  61,3% 80,2% 
Private job training 57,2% 76,9% 
Adult Apprenticeship support 77% 90% 
Labour trainee 57,6% 76% 
Public sector employment  30,7% 69,9% 
Public job training 35,3% 70,4% 
Individual job training 28,4% 69,3% 
Pool jobs 17,6% 100% 
Service jobs 44,2% 80,1% 
Voluntary not paid activities 21,5% 67,9% 
Education and training 39,5% 75,7% 
Education with training allowance 43,1% 75,9% 
Adult education subsidies 62,7% 94,4% 
Specially adapted education 20,7% 70,6% 
Adult and further education 35,9% 83% 
Services and sanctions 39,9% 72,6% 
Intensive job seeking 41,8% 72,9% 
Advisory activation 37,9% 72,2% 
 
In a first experience Et, let A be the event that beneficiaries find a job one year latter t+1 with p(A) the 
probability of the event A (with Abar, the opposite event of A, p (Abar)=1-p(A)). To model the second 
experience Et+2, let B be the event that beneficiaries transit to work at time t+2 with p(B), the probability of 
event or evidence B. For all event B, we call P(B|A) the conditional probability that beneficiaries stay in 
employment in t+2, given that they successfully managed to find a job one year after participating into one of 
the selected schemes t+1. 
 
Table A10. Differences-in-differences estimates: employment rates  
 
 Before After Evolution Rel. evolution  
 
(n-1): 
YiBe 
(n+1): 
YiAf 
(first difference):  
∆Yi 
(sec. diff.):  
βddd 
Participants to private sector emp.  26% 61,3% 35,3 29,1 
 Participants to other programs 28% 34,2% 6,2 
Participants to public sector emp.  22,8% 30,7% 7,9          -1 
 Participants to other programs 29,5% 38,4% 8,9 
Participants to Education and training 30,6% 39,5% 8,9 0,4 
 Participants to other programs 26,5% 35% 8,5 
Participants to services and sanctions  39,9% 43,2% 3,3 0,4 
 Participants to other programs 35,8% 38,7% 2,9
 
YiBe: employment rate for participants before activation. YiAf: employment rate for participants after activation. 
Let’s notice that participants to other programs form the “control group”.   ∆Yi =YiAf - YiBe: Change within the 
activation experience.   βddd = (ŷ(participants to a specific type of programs, Af - (participants to a specific type program, Be) - ŷ(participants to other 
programs, Af - (participants to other programs, Be). 
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